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REDISCOVERING THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE:
FEDERALISM AND THE ROLLBACK OF
INCORPORATION
William K. Lietzau*
INTRODUCTION
In 1791 the people of the United States ratified the first amendment to
our Constitution and thus enshrined the two principles deemed necessary for
preserving religious liberty. First, the free exercise clause acknowledged a
fundamental substantive right: each citizen was guaranteed the freedom to
believe and practice in accordance with their own religious convictions.'
Second, the establishment clause embodied a structural safeguard to maxi-
mize protection of this substantive right: a framework of federalism was
instituted to preserve religious liberty by fostering local decisionmaking
authority on church/state issues.2 The national government was thus specif-
ically enjoined from dictating any policy in the area of religious establish-
ment.3 These principles facilitated the gradual development of constitutional
law for 150 years as the United States learned to accommodate a multiplicity
of new religious viewpoints. This development, however, ceased in 1947
when the Supreme Court began actively adjudicating in the area of religion
while ignoring the first amendment's structural safeguards. 4
The first amendment expressly prohibits the "United States Congress"
from making any law "respecting an establishment of religion." Yet, in its
treatment of this clause, the Supreme Court has focused almost exclusively
* Judge Advocate, United States Marine Corps; B.S., 1983, United States Naval Academy;
J.D., 1989, Yale Law School. Many thanks to Akhil Amar, John Edwards, Robert Pushaw,
Scott Ward and to my wife Diane, for their helpful comments and stimulating conversation.
1. "Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]; . U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
2. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion .... U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
3. It is this second structural or procedural aspect which is too often overlooked and will
be analyzed in this Article. See M. MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS: THE INTENTIONS OF THE
AUTHORS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 15 (1978) (arguing that most commentators fail to see dual
purpose of first amendment and underestimate importance of nation-state issue for members
of first Congress).
4. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (establishment clause incorporated
by fourteenth amendment). The Court had previously begun hearing state-based free exercise
cases with Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). In Cantwell, the Court held that the
free exercise clause was made applicable against the states by the fourteenth amendment. Id.
at 303-04.
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on the actions of state governments.' While state-run public schools are
prohibited from posting the Ten Commandments 6 or having prayer in the
classroom,7 Congress has directed the printing of "In God We Trust" on
all United States currency,' and United States military academies have school-
wide prayer before each meal. 9 Similarly, states are prohibited from using
public funds to supplement parochial school teacher salaries, 10 yet Congress
regularly uses federal funds for its own chaplains and an extensive military
chaplaincy." These examples represent far more than mere inconsistencies;
they reflect a complete inversion of the framework set up by our founders. 2
The past forty years have been attended by much debate regarding estab-
lishment clause interpretation which has resulted in both incoherence in
theory and inconsistency in application. 3 This confusion has been criticized
by numerous commentators, but nearly all have focused on a more accurate
5. Prior to incorporation, the Supreme Court had not even squarely defined "establishment
of religion" and had heard only three cases implicating establishment clause concerns. Cochran
v. Louisiana Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930) (Louisiana's purchase of nonsectarian textbooks
for students in parochial schools upheld); Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908) (payments
to a Roman Catholic school on an Indian reservation upheld); Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S.
291 (1899) (congressional payments to benefit poor at a religious District of Columbia hospital
found constitutional). In no pre-Everson case was a government action ever found to violate
the establishment clause. J. REICHLEY, RELIGION IN AmaRucA PUBLIc LIFE 33 (1985).
The occurrence of establishment clause litigation has multiplied significantly since Everson.
For statistics regarding the incidence of church-state cases, see F. SoRAUF, THE WALL OF
SEPARATION 339 (1973).
6. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223-25 (1963).
7. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 48-61 (1985); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 453 (1962).
8. 31 U.S.C. § 5112(d)(1) (1982). Congress, since 1865, has regularly enacted legislation
mandating that "In God We Trust" be impressed on our coins. E.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1865,
ch. C, § 5, 13 Stat. 517; Act of Feb. 12, 1873, ch. CXXXI, § 18, 17 Stat. 427; Act of May
18, 1906, ch. 173, 35 Stat. 164; Act of July 11, 1955, ch. 303, 69 Stat. 290.
9. Until recently, all students at military academies were also required to attend chapel
services. See Engel, 370 U.S. at 438 n.2 (Douglas, J., concurring).
10. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 611-25 (1971). See also Wolman v. Walter, 433
U.S. 229, 248-55 (1977) (no books, salaries or transportation costs); Meek v. Pittenger, 421
U.S. 349, 362-66 (1975) (no providing books or other supplies).
11. See Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223, 229 (2d Cir. 1985). One of the first acts of
Congress was to establish the offices of the House and Senate chaplains. I J. OF SENATE 16
(Apr. 7, 1789); 1 J. OF HousE REp. 26 (Apr. 9, 1789). As late as 1954, Congress added "one
Nation under God ... " to our pledge of allegiance. Engel, 370 U.S. at 449 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting); 36 U.S.C. § 172 (1954). In 1952, Congress called upon the president to proclaim a
National Day of Prayer. 36 U.S.C. § 185 (1952).
12. Apparent inconsistencies have been individually justified by their differing contexts. See,
e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60-61 & n.51 (1985) (secondary school prayer distinguished
from congressional prayer due to the malleable nature of young minds); Katcoff, 755 F.2d at
223, 232-35 (military chaplaincy distinguished due to exigencies of military life). The adequacy
of such distinguishing rationales is severely limited by the frequency of their use and the
consistent bias of outcome.
13. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 107 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[I]n the 38 years since Everson
our Establishment Clause cases have been neither principled nor unified"); L. LEVY, THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 162 (1986).
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interpretation of "establishment of religion" instead of the propriety of the
clause's application against state governments via "incorporation" into the
fourteenth amendment.1 4 The several critics of establishment clause incor-
poration either fail to distinguish the clause in the context of selective
incorporation, thus making arguments which undercut Bill of Rights incor-
poration in toto,15 or they treat the issue as moot and ignore underlying
federalism concerns which promote religious liberty and militate in favor of
a rollback. 6
This Article argues that the establishment clause, both as originally con-
ceived and as understood during the Reconstruction, was meant to be applied
only against the national government. Incorporation, therefore, is neither
mandated nor permitted. 7 Examined in light of the current policy debate
over establishment clause application, the Court's error regarding incorpo-
ration proves to be much more than a mere misreading of history; it is an
assault on the very heart of the first amendment's religious liberty protec-
tions. A return to the proper interpretation of the first amendment would
vindicate the framers' intent and positively influence the policy goal of
preserving religious freedom.
This Article proffers a potentially effective balance between church/state
relations on a national level and church/state relations on a state level, 8
which comports with relevant legal history and provides a procedural frame-
14. See, e.g., R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT
FICTION (1982); E. CORWIN, A CONSTITUTION OF POWERS IN A SECULAR STATE (1951); T. CURRY,
THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
(1986); M. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (1965); J. RrictLEY, supra note 5, at 5; Kurland, The Irrelevance of
the Constitution: The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24
VILL. L. REv. 3, 9 (1978).
15. See, e.g., Jaffree v. Board. of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. 1104, 1112-18 (S.D.
Ala.), rev'd sub nom. Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 472 U.S. 38
(1985).
16. See, e.g., E. CORWIN, supra note 14, at 116; D. DREISBACH, REAL THREAT AND MERE
SHADOW (1987); Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Ap-
proach to Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 311, 317-26 (1986).
One work deserving of special recognition for distinguishing the uniquely problematic nature
of incorporating the establishment clause is Snee, Religious Disestablishment and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 1954 WASH. U.L.Q. 371. Much of Professor Snee's article is still relevant today.
Missing, however, is hindsight analysis explaining why incorporation, which Snee at the time
thought could still be avoided, is a policy detrimental to religious liberty and not just a historical
mistake.
17. Cf. E. CORWIN, supra note 14, at 116 ("So far as the Fourteenth Amendment is
concerned, States are entirely free to establish religion, provided they do not deprive anybody
of religious liberty"); but cf. M. HOWE, supra note 14, at 138-46 (finding establishment clause
to be constitutionally "permitted" if carefully applied, though not "mandated").
18. Most commentators instead focus on an appropriate balance between free exercise and
nonestablishment. This Article does not intend to discredit any of the valid criticisms regarding
Supreme Court misunderstandings about the intended extent of disestablishment or the inherent
tension between free exercise and nonestablishment.
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work sufficiently subtle to deal with the complicated policy considerations
involved. Section I of this Article provides historical background which
demonstrates that today's inverted application of nonestablishment principles
is antithetical to the intentions of the framers. Next, section II examines the
Court's legally questionable treatment of the establishment clause and briefly
discusses the prospects for change. Finally, section III illustrates how the
clause's current application undermines religious freedom and promotes a
bias in favor of atheistic or "nonreligious" philosophical viewpoints. Calling
for a limited rollback in establishment clause incorporation doctrine, this
final section evaluates the policy implications of a reconstruction of the
federalist framework and details its positive consequences with respect to
religious liberty.
I. HISTORIcAL FOUNDATIONS
[A] great many Americans . . . tend to think that because a majority of
the justices have the power to bind us by their law they are also empowered
to bind us by their history. Happily that is not the case. Each of us is
entirely free to find his history in other places than the pages of the United
States Reports.
-Mark DeWolfe Howe, 1965"1
Critics of establishment clause jurisprudence frequently look to first
amendment history to support a particular view of proper church/state
relations. Similarly, commentators on the fourteenth amendment cite appli-
cable history to either favor or condemn incorporation of the first eight
amendments into the fourteenth amendment's due process guarantee. Both
pursuits are useful as academic exercises, but are nonetheless unlikely to
generate significant movements in constitutional law. 20 Hence, this Article
does not dwell on these legalistic arguments regarding incorporation or
specific historical views on church/state policies. Instead, it attempts to
analyze the policy reasons behind the federalist scheme originally developed
for the area of church and state relations.
A. The First Amendment
The first amendment can only be understood in light of the religious and
political concerns guiding its framers. Realizing that there is no single
accepted view of constitutional interpretation, this Article presumes that the
framers' intent is, at the very least, an important factor to be considered
when applying constitutional principles.2 While the efficacy of historical
analysis is severely limited for resolving inquiries about the "correct" un-
19. M. HowE, supra note 14, at 5.
20. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 48 (1985).
21. "The intention of the lawmaker is the law." Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 212
(1903). The importance and relevance of "original intention" has been attacked by numerous
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derstanding of religious establishment, this is not the case with respect to
the question of establishment clause incorporation. Viewed with the fore-
knowledge of selective incorporation, applicable history definitively exempts
the establishment clause from the category of "fundamental rights" appro-
priately constraining the states.
1. Colonial Antecedents
Our constitution was made only for a moral and a religious people. It is
wholly inadequate for the government of any other.
-John Adams12
Considering the present importance of the Bill of Rights, it is surprising
to note that the First Congress spent relatively little time discussing its
provisions.21 What were considered to be more pressing needs account for
some of this legislative apathy, but much of the inattention follows from
the fact that there was little dispute as to what rights were deemed funda-
mental.2 In 1789, the state charters, laws, and declarations of rights had
the primary responsibility for protecting individual liberty. 25 It is therefore
reasonable to look to these more painstakingly drafted precursors to the Bill
of Rights in order to unveil its meaning. 6
Since its inception, this nation's life has been animated by religious
movements and accompanying questions about appropriate church/state
relations. Historians have described religion's role in colonial America as
scholars. See, e.g., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 363-72 (1977) (favoring original
intent restrictions on the judiciary); L. LEVY, JUDGMENTS: ESSAYS IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY 17 (1972) (claiming that there was no intent to "freeze" the Constitution's original
meaning). Nevertheless, few scholars would claim a discernable legislative intent to be devoid
of import. James Madison once opined: "if the sense in which the Constitution was accepted
and ratified by the Nation . .. be not the guide in expounding it, there can be no security for
a consistent and stable [government]." 9 J. MADISON, Tm WRITINGS OF JAmS MADISON 191
(G. Hunt ed. 1900-1910), noted in R. BERGER, supra, at 3, 364.
22. See R. NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE 95 (1984).
23. Professor Levy describes the debates as "brief, listless, and unclear." L. LEVY, supra
note 13, at 108. Describing individual speeches as "sometimes irrelevant, usually apathetic and
unclear," Levy calls it "doubtful" whether most members of the House understood or even
cared about the outcome of the debates. Id. at 79. See also M. MALBIN, supra note 3, at 5-6
(discussing length of debates). Madison even had difficulty getting the House to agree to discuss
the amendments. L. LEVY, supra note 13, at 108.
24. It is also reasonable to infer that the substance of the rights themselves was fairly well
agreed upon. See 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 587
(1966) (Col. Mason suggesting during Constitutional Convention that a Bill of Rights could be
prepared "in a few hours" with the aid of state declarations). The debate during framing was
whether or not to have a Bill of Rights, not what those rights should be.
25. See B. SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT RIOiTS OF MANKIND 53-103 (1977) (general discussion
of revolutionary era protections of fundamental rights).
26. The Anglo-American practice of drafting lists of rights had its genesis in 1215 with the
Magna Charta. Religious liberty is conspicuously absent from this original bill and its English
descendants, but is the most common right found in American bills. Id.
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"the single most influential cultural force." 27 Many of the first settlers came
to this country seeking to escape religious persecution, but they also came
with the intent of establishing the "city on a hill," an exemplary community
committed to Christian principles.28 As a result, they did not abandon state
established religion, but adjusted the establishments to suit their various
religious needs. 29
Such strongly religious peoples were rarely in complete doctrinal agree-
ment, and minority groups were sometimes the subject of discrimination. 0
The colonists thus learned that inviolable safeguards were needed to protect
religious rights. Revolutionary documents and colonial charters reveal that
many of the precursors to the Bill of Rights contained provisions providing
for the free exercise of religion. In fact, this was the only right protected in
every state constitution." By contrast, no state constitution mandated church/
27. See J. REICHLEY, supra note 5, at 53. See also S. AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 160 (1975) (statistics on colonial America's religious involvement).
28. Many Puritans, for example, believed that God established the state for the purpose of
restraining sin. See T. CURRY, supra note 14, at 3; J. DRAPER & F. WATSON, IF THE FOUNDATIONS
BE DESTROYED 26-40 (1984); J. ErDsuoE, CHRISTIANITY AND THE CONSTITUTION 28 (1987); P.
MILLER, ERRAND INTO THE WILDERNESS 1-15 (1965).
This view of America as a godly society to serve as a model for the old corrupted world was
not quickly lost during colonial growth and is by no means extinct today. In his celebrated
speech just prior to the signing of the Declaration of Independence, Patrick Henry said:
Father! The old world is . . .drenched with the blood of millions who have been
executed, in slow and grinding oppression. Father, look! With one glance of Thine
eternal eye, look over Europe, Asia, Africa, and behold everywhere a terrible
sight-man trodden down beneath the oppressor's feet, nations lost in blood, murder
and superstition walking hand in hand over the graves of their victims, and not a
single voice to whisper hope to man.
... But hark! The voice of Jehovah speaks out from the awful cloud: Let there
be light again. Let there be a new world. Tell My people, the poor, downtrodden
millions, to go out from the old world. Tell them to go out from the old world to
build up My altar in the new.
P. Henry, Speech given in Independence Hall, Philadelphia, prior to the signing of the
Declaration of Independence (July 4, 1776), reprinted in AMERICAN STATE ARTICLES ON FREEDOM
OF RELIGION 70-72 (W. Blakely, ed. 1943).
29. For a history of church establishments in the colonies see J. REICHLEY, supra note 5,
at 53-96; J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 24 (1873).
Save perhaps Rhode Island, Story claimed that every state from the founding on:
[D]id openly, by the whole course of its laws and institutions, support and sustain
in some form the Christian religion; and almost invariably gave a peculiar sanction
to some of its fundamental doctrines .... Any attempt .. .to hold all [religions)
in utter indifference would have created universal disapprobation, if not universal
indignation.
Id. at 604. See also S. AHISTROM, supra note 27, at 160 (1975) (statistics on colonial America's
religious involvement).
30. See L. LEVY, supra note 13, at 1-24.
31. By the end of the Revolutionary War, each of the thirteen state constitutions contained
provisions protecting religious freedom. The right was usually fashioned "freedom of con-
science," and involved espousal of a policy of toleration for all personal beliefs. Forced doctrinal
statements or mandatory oaths were especially inimical. For a listing of declarations and the
frequency of the occurrence of various rights see B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 25, at 87.
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state separation as we know it today.3 2 At the beginning of the revolution,
eight colonies had established churches, 3 and at the 1789 meeting of the
First Congress, religious establishments remained throughout most of New
England.3 4
Several rights enumerated in the first ten amendments were widely rec-
ognized prior to the framing of the Bill of Rights. Freedom of religion was
clearly one of them." This did not mean, however, that nonestablishment
was necessary as a corollary principle. Indeed, many would have argued that
religious convictions demanded expression through popular government.3 6
Each of the thirteen colonies developed its own scheme for securing the one
liberty that was universally accepted, namely freedom of conscience." In
protecting that freedom they employed varying degrees of state sponsorship
of religion. Free exercise was not seen to include freedom from the influence
of an established church or religion, but freedom to accept or reject the
"established" doctrines. Thus, establishment and free exercise coexisted with
minimal conflict.3 9 "Separation of church and state" was a foreign and
32. See M. KowvITz, BILL OF RIOHTS READER 60 (1968). Only New Jersey's document
protecting the freedom of religion contained a rudimentary clause prohibiting the establishment
of a particular sect. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 25, at 87.
33. Virginia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia all had established
the Church of England. Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Hampshire had established
Congregationalism. While New York did not establish a specific denomination, it effectively
mandated Protestantism. See M. KONVITZ, supra note 32, at 104; L. LEVY, supra note 13, at
5.
34. For a history of the evolution of state religious establishments, see L. LEvY, supra note
13, at 5.
35. Other examples of protected rights and the frequency of their occurrence among state
declarations are: free speech (found in two), freedom of press (found in ten), freedom of
assembly (found in four), right to bear arms (found in four). For a list of other popular rights
see B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 25, at 89.
36. See T. CURRY, supra note 14, at 219 (arguing that most desired general Protestant ethos
and morality in government).
37. It is interesting to note that even today, all 50 state constitutions contain provisions
protecting "freedom of worship." Only 34 mandate limitations on religious establishment. See
infra note 209.
38. For example, Rhode Island allowed for all protestant sects, while Massachusetts man-
dated church establishment but allowed towns to choose the church. CASES ON CHURCH AND
STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 27-28 (M. Howe ed. 1952). See L. PFE'ERt, CHURCH, STATE AND
FREEDOM 63-80 (1953). For discussions of the various colonial schemes, see A. STOKES, CHURCH
AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 358-444 (1950).
39. Common elements among schemes for protecting religious freedom included explicit
protection of the freedom of conscience and localized control of religious establishment. Many
states simply adopted a nonpreferentialist approach with respect to the various Christian
denominations. The standard New England argument in favor of established churches was that
religion was necessary for civil society and therefore should be promoted. There was no violation
of conscience so long as no one was forced to pay for a religion not his own. M. CURTIS, No
STATE SHALL ABRInXE 203 (1968); cf. L. LEvY, supra note 13, at 2 (inadvertent concession in
coexistence of religious liberty and establishment by arguing that John Adams' espousal of
establishment was of a "slender [establishment]"). See also A MEMOIR OF Tm LIFE AND TIMES
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untested concept, and the few polities which embraced some separationist
principles were at great disagreement as to the extent and reason for the
separation. Even the most limited nonestablishment principles by no means
enjoyed widespread recognition among the states or the American people.
Responses resulting from ratification debates are another source of eight-
eenth century popular opinion. Five states sent proposals to Congress rec-
ommending that certain protections be incorporated into the Constitution.4
Again, religious liberty took the lead as the most commonly recommended
guarantee among those endorsed by ratifying states. 4 ' The focus of these
proposals was protection of free exercise. Only the wording of New Hamp-
shire's recommendation could reasonably be construed to advocate church/
state separation: "Congress shall make no laws touching religion, or to
infringe the rights of conscience. ' ' 42 Even so comprehended, however, this
clause was clearly not meant to espouse separation of church and government
generally, as at the time of ratification, New Hampshire citizens were required
to provide financial support to local churches.43 Instead, only national
impotence was contemplated. Recorded debates at the various ratifying
conventions confirm the federalism based intent of state recommendations
regarding religious liberty.44
2. Framing the First Amendment
A rule of law should not be drawn from a figure of speech.
-Justice Reed, 1948 4
In 1788, the First Congress drafted the Bill of Rights in an effort to allay
fears that too much power might be appropriated by a distant national
government.4 6 Federalism concerns dictated that the amendments would serve
OF THE REVEREND ISAAC BACKUS 210 (1958) (similar claim regarding Yale president Ezra Stiles).
But see Jones, Writings of the Reverend William Tennent, 1740-1777, 61 S.C. HIST. MAO. 197
(1960) (discussing Presbyterian minister's claim that all establishments are an infringement of
religious liberty).
40. See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 25, at 120-57 for a discussion of the recommendations
from Massachusetts, South Carolina, New Hampshire, Virginia and New York.
41. Id. at 157.
42. See 1 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 326 (1937).
43. L. LEVY, supra note 13, at 24-25. New Hampshire's "multiple establishment" allowed
local citizens to choose the church their community would support. In most cases this effectively
established Congregationalism. Id.
44. See, e.g., Speech by James Madison, reprinted in 3 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 330 (1888 ed.)
(Madison stating at Virginia's ratifying convention, "There is not a shadow of right in the
general government to intermeddle with religion .... It is better that this security should be
depended upon from the general legislature, than from one particular State. A particular State
might concur in one religious project.").
45. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 247 (1948) (Reed, J., dissenting).
46. See generally C. KENYON, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS (1985); H. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-
FEDERALISTS WERE FOR (1981); see also Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 39 HARV. L. REV. 431, 431 (1926) (arguing that state authority was jealously
preserved in areas of local interest).
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the dual purposes of protecting personal rights and restricting federal power.
This distinction is rarely so clearly exemplified as it is in the religion clauses
of the Bill of Rights-the free exercise clause protects an individual right to
religious freedom, the establishment clause restricts federal power to subvert
state policies for protecting that right.47 Americans were convinced that
church and state issues had been satisfactorily settled by the various states.48
The words "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion," therefore, did not reflect a shared concept of a "wall of separa-
tion," a metaphor coined years after the Bill of Rights was ratified, 49 but
instead expressed a prohibition against any federal action which tended either
to establish or disestablish a state church.
The term "respecting" has been expansively construed to incorporate any
church/state interaction as opposed to an actual "establishment." While this
broadened interpretation may be justifiable, it cannot support an extension
of nonestablishment concepts to states. The establishment clause was an
explicit restriction on the federal government's power to meddle in the
religious establishments that then existed. Any expanded understanding of
"respecting" must be based on this limited focus. Properly understood then,
"respecting an establishment" could be rephrased, "having to do with state
and local religious establishment policies." Obviously, an expansion of this
phraseology, even if possible, would have to constitute less, not more, federal
ability to dictate establishment policies.5 0
The framers of the religion clauses entered into debate in an attempt to
codify the prevailing policies and principles regarding religious liberty and
government. Commentators have pointed to various historical statutes and
personalities to promote a particular view of dominant 19th century church/
state separation theory.5 The first amendment, however, does not represent
47. Chancellor Kent argued that the only right protected in the religion clauses was free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship; not freedom from others. 4 1.
KENT, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION 216 (1873). See also Paulsen, supra note 16, at 323-
24 (both clauses represent one substantive right).
48. See T. CURRY, supra note 14, at 194.
49. Jefferson used the image in a letter to the Baptists of Danbury, Connecticut, fourteen
years after the first amendment was drafted. 16 JEFFERSON'S WORKS 281 (Monticello ed. 1903).
See also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (discussing the
"short note" to the Danbury Baptists, "[Tlhe Establishment Clause has been expressly freighted
with Jefferson's misleading metaphor for nearly 40 years."); J. REICL.EY, supra note 5, at 111
(more thorough discussion of letter to Danbury Baptists).
Jefferson actually borrowed the terminology from Roger Williams. See M. How-, supra note
14, at 5-6; P. MILLER, ROGER WILLIA s: His CONTRIBUTION TO THE AMERICAN TRADITION 89,
98 (1953).
50. But see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) ("A given law might not establish
a state religion but nevertheless be one 'respecting' that end in the sense of being a step that
could lead to such an establishment .... " (emphasis in original)).
51. For criticism citing history supporting a nonpreferentialist position or a more narrow
view of establishment, see C. ANTEAU, A. DOWNEY & E. ROBERTS, FREEDOM FROM FEDERAL
ESTABLISHMENT; FORMATION AND EARLY HISTORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT RELIGION CLAUSES
1990] 1199
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the triumph of one party or viewpoint. The important truth to be gleaned
from the relevant history is not found in a particular theory, but in the fact
that there was no consensus on proper church/state relations. 2 The only
agreement was that the issue was properly left to the state and local govern-
ments and that the federal government should therefore have no legislative
authority in the area. Religious liberty was supported by the establishment
clause through a diffusion of power and a scheme which insured a polity's
right to select its own form of religious establishment.
Legislative history surrounding the framing of the first amendment is fairly
extensive,53 and supports this understanding. 4 House debates reveal a shared
understanding that the establishment clause was intended to limit national
power." Even a clause requiring state acknowledgment of free exercise rights
(1964); R. CORD, supra note 14, at 214-39; E. CORWIN, supra note 14, at 88-118; McClellan,
The Making and the Unmaking of the Establishment Clause, in A BLUEPRINT FOR JUDICIAL
REFORM (1981); J. DRAPER & F. WATSON, supra note 28; M. MALBIN, supra note 3, at 1-17,
39-40; W. McGLOUGHLIN, ISAAC BACIUS AND THE AMERICAN PIETISTIC TRADITION (1976); J.
O'NELL, RELIGION AND EDUCATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION (1949).
For views claiming a broad interpretation of establishment, see I. BRANT, JAMES MADISON,
THE NATIONALIST, 1780-1787 (1948); Dixon, Religion, Schools and the Open Society, 13 J. PUB.
L. 267 (1964); Pfeffer, The Case for Separation, in RELIGION IN AMERICA: ORIGINAl. ESSAYS ON
RELIGION IN A FREE SOCIETY (J. Cogley, ed. 1968); L. LEVY, supra note 13, at 165-85. Some
critics opine that several of this nation's founders supported religious influence in government.
Era legislation is cited for the proposition that there was intent to support religion generally.
The Northwest Ordinance, for example, is often cited because of its entreaty for encouragement
of religion while providing for full religious liberty. Article I of the ordinance states: "No
person .. . shall ever be molested on account of his mode of worship or religious sentiments
in said territory." Article III states, "Religion, morality, and knowledge being necessary to
good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall
forever be encouraged." See P. SCHAFF, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 119 (1888).
What was once mandated is now proscribed.
52. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 834 (1978) (arguing that Court is mistaken
in its exclusive reliance on Jeffersonian concepts of church/state separation); Paulsen, supra
note 16, at 322 (incoherence in establishment clause jurisprudence is result of Court's reliance
on conflicting Madisonian and Jeffersonian separation concepts).
53. The religion clauses were given more attention than any other provisions in the Bill of
Rights. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 420 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1789) [hereinafter ANNALS]; L. TRIBE,
supra note 52, at 819.
54. See Snee, supra note 16, at 371-94 for an excellent summary of relevant legal history.
55. There are no minutes from Senate hearings, but their changes to House proposals suggest
a general attempt to group the numerous House clauses and refine the verbose wording. See
T. CURRY, supra note 14, at 214 (arguing that the Senate changes were merely in composition,
"not substance").
Bernard Schwartz describes the Senate changes as "substantial improvements," excepting
only what he sees as a weakened provision on religious freedom. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 25,
at 184-85. Responding to Schwartz, it is interesting to note that the Senate made all the revised
amendments more succinct except for that regarding religious freedom. It is unlikely that this
conscious and deliberate lengthening of the religion clause was a clumsy slip into less effective
wording. The longer, yet more precise Senate version of the religion clause is better seen as a
general attempt to limit and define the scope of disestablishment. The new version read,
"Congress shall make no law establishing articles of faith, or a mode of worship, or prohibiting
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was rejected in a vote of confidence for the ability of states to protect
liberty. 6
Ironically, there was concern that future generations might misread the
establishment clause as inhering too general a principle of disestablishment.
Mr. Sylvester and Mr. Huntington expressed concern that the language used
might tend to hurt the cause of religion altogether, "a construction different
from what had been made by the committee." '57 Madison offered a potential
solution to this difficulty by suggesting that the clause be amended to
specifically proscribe a "national" establishment, thereby "point[ing] the
amendment directly to the object it was intended to prevent." 58 Madison's
proposal was defeated due to distaste for the word "national," but the
colloquy which took place supports the limited meaning properly ascribed
to the clause.
Bill of Rights ratification debates make little mention of the establishment
clause.5 9 This silence, however, is not without import. All the states with
established churches ratified the amendment without any expressed concern.6
Lack of debate on the religion clauses indicates that they were understood
to have no adverse effect on state authority. In fact, the inverse is true,
because the establishment clause was a specific protection of state authority.
In this way, the establishment clause most closely resembled the tenth
amendment. 6 While the tenth amendment protected state legislative com-
petence generally, the establishment clause specifically and obdurately pro-
tected that authority in the area of religion. The establishment clause is thus
primarily an embodiment of a principle of federalism with respect to church/
state relations. Indeed, the specific proscription of the first amendment makes
the free exercise of religion ..... " See id. In a compromise agreement, a House-Senate
conference committee finally chose phrasing closer to that of the House, while the Senate
version prevailed on all other provisions as did the Senate's grouping of clauses within the first
amendment. Id.
56. 1 ANNALS, supra note 53, at 685.
57. 1 ANNALS, supra note 53, at 729. Huntington later elaborated on the concern, giving
an example that a misreading of the clause might make some think that they could not be
compelled to support ministers or the building of a meeting house. Id. at 758. Huntington
feared that even states might be inhibited from furthering or establishing a religion. No one
argued that such an intent would be appropriate. They only sought to preclude such a misreading.
58. Id.
59. B. ScHwARTz, supra note 25, at 187. Even news articles were silent regarding the religion
clauses. Id.
60. Some scholars have noted the fact that several states with establishments ratified the
amendments late. See L. LEVY, supra note 13, at 83. There is no evidence, however, that the
reason for this was concern over the establishment clause. Evidence suggests that Massachusetts
agreed to the amendments before ratification but failed to forward its decision because of
administrative errors. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 25, at 189-91.
61. Wilber Katz has stated, "It seems undeniable that the First Amendment operated, and
was intended to operate, to protect from Congressional interference the varying state policies
of church establishment. The Amendment thus embodied a principle of federalism." W. KATZ,
RELIGION AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 9 (1964).
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for a stronger claim against government involvement in religious establish-
ment than any other state right embraced by the tenth amendment. 62
3. Early 19th Century Understanding
Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, religion
and morality are indispensible supports. In vain would that man claim the
tribute of patriotism, who should labor to subvert these great pillars of
human happiness, these firmest props of the duties of men and citizens.
-George Washington, 179663
There is little doubt that the first amendment initially reflected a feder-
alism-based policy of exclusive state authority over the subject of religion. 64
Some would claim, however, that the first amendment's "incomplete" as-
sertion of disestablishment principles is a flaw resulting from the nascent
state of the nation's experience with nonestablishment and the enlightenment
of its citizens. They suggest that the country's more progressive thinkers,
i.e., Madison and Jefferson, clearly favored disestablishment. 6' While not
devoid of merit, this simplistic perspective reveals a lack of understanding
with respect to the views of the framers. 6
James Madison desired more restraint on state ability to violate religious
freedom, yet his rejected proposal of a state-oriented free exercise amend-
ment, unlike its federal counterpart, contained no parallel restriction on
religious establishment. 67 This conspicuous omission demonstrates that even
Madison, an undisputed nationalist and leader in the area of church and
state policy, did not view general disestablishment as a necessary prerequisite
62. See Snee, supra note 16, at 406-07.
63. See J. REICH1.Y, supra note 5, at 103.
64. Justice Story stated: "Thus, the whole power over the subject of religion is left exclusively
to the State governments, to be acted upon according to their own sense of justice and the
State constitutions." J. STORY, supra note 29, at 116. Story is often cited for his argument
favoring a restricted interpretation of establishment generally. It is interesting to note that this
view is expressed as an argument, however, and thus opens itself to counter-claims. Conversely,
Justice Story needed to make no argument in support of his statement about the federalism
foundations of the establishment clause. Apparently he assumed agreement as to its federal
intent, and the policy needed no defense.
65. See L. LEvy, supra note 13, at 38-39, 79-90. See generally B. SCHWARTZ, supra note
25. Schwartz and Levy both describe the evolution of the first amendment as if it were a
"discovery" in which the nation gradually came to realize that there was a two-fold aspect to
freedom of religion. A more accurate narrative is that the nation learned better and more
efficient ways to guarantee one right: freedom of conscience.
66. While the church/state views of both Madison and Jefferson are difficult to discern,
and somewhat inconsistent, the same can not be said for their views on the federalist component
of the first amendment. D. DREISBACH, supra note 16, at 101-08.
67. James Madison originally proposed an amendment prohibiting state violation of freedom
of conscience, freedom of press, and the right to jury trial. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 25, at
233. The proposed amendment was defeated in the Senate. Id, at 182. Cf. J. REICLEY, supra
note 5, at 108-09 (discussing the incorrect assertion by Madison's biographers, Irving Brant and
Walter Berns, that Madison's original amendment would have eliminated state establishments).
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for religious liberty. 6 While Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance indeed
suggests a push toward more complete separation in Virginia,
nonpreferentialists69 have asserted that it is more accurately seen as an
argument against discriminatory advancement of one religion. 70 More im-
portantly, Madison's struggle to disestablish the Anglican church does not
undermine the fact that he viewed disestablishment as a policy matter
properly decided by state polities. The only right discussed in the Memorial
is the "unalienable right" to free exercise of religion.',
Thomas Jefferson, widely recognized as the most vigorous advocate of
church/state separation and author of the "wall of separation" metaphor, 72
had a similar understanding of the federalism principles inherent in the
establishment clause. As President of the United States, first amendment
principles precluded Jefferson from declaring customary fast and thanksgiv-
ing days as previous presidents had done. 71 Yet, as a state legislator, Jefferson
demonstrated his understanding that states should be free to legislate in
religious matters by voting in favor of a bill empowering Virginia's governor
to make such declarations,7 4 by himself decreeing a day of prayer as gov-
ernor, 7 and by advocating use of a city court house for Sunday worship
services.7 6 At his second inaugural address Jefferson stated:
68. But cf. Letter of E. Livingston, July 10, 1822, in 9 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 100
(1865) (claiming that in spite of fast day proclamations, Madison would have preferred "perfect
separation"). While he did not espouse separationist policies politically or as a constitutional
matter, it is not unreasonable to conclude that, personally, Madison would not have been
hesitant to support even local establishments. See, e.g., 1 WRITINos OF JAMES MADISON 153-54
(1865) (Madison stating in a letter, "it gives me much pleasure to observe by 2 printed reports
sent me by Col. Grayson, that, in the latter, Congress had expunged a clause contained in the
first, for setting apart a district of land in each Township for supporting the Religion of the
majority of inhabitants"); M. MALBIN, supra note 3, at 16 (Madison opposed Virginia's tax
distributions to all church denominations). In spite of these specific situations, most agree that
Madison would not require strict neutrality between religion generally and irreligion. Id.
69. Nonpreferentialism is a view which interprets the establishment clause to call for
government neutrality with respect to various churches or denominations, but not necessarily
religion generally. See generally L. LEvY, supra note 13, at 162-65, for a criticism of nonpre-
ferentialism.
70. D. DREISBACH, supra note 16, at 102, 146-50.
71. It is interesting to note that Remonstrance supporters were essentially battling a religious
minority. Even the Remonstrance leaves open the possibility of enacting such an establishing
bill with "the clearest evidence that it is called for by a majority .... " J. Madison, Memorial
and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (presented to the General Assembly of the
Commonwealth of Virginia), in II THm WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183-91 (Hunt ed. 1901-
1910).
72. But see M. HowE, supra note 14, at 6 (arguing that Roger Williams, with his primarily
evangelical/theological motivation for separation, played a larger role in making the "wall" a
constitutional barrier than did Jefferson, with his political orientation); J. KENT, supra note
47, at 216 (arguing that Roger Williams set the stage for religious liberty).
73. H. RANDALL, THE LIFE OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 2 (1855).
74. Comment, Jefferson and the Church-State Wall: A Historical Examination of the Man
and the Metaphor, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REv. 645, 656-66.
75. D. DREISBACH, supra note 16, at 109.
76. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Dr. Thomas Cooper (Nov. 2, 1822), reprinted in M.
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In matters of religion, I have considered that its free exercise is placed by
the Constitution independent of the powers of the General government. I
have therefore undertaken, on no occasion, to prescribe the religious
exercises suited to it, but have left them as the Constitution found them,
under the direction and discipline of State and Church authorities ...
(emphasis added)"
It is paradoxical that the Supreme Court selectively invokes Jeffersonian
views to enjoin state involvements with religion, while ignoring the federal
entanglements he so vehemently opposed."
The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions provide additional examples of
both Madison's and Jefferson's views on the important federalism concept
embodied in the establishment clause. In each, a comparison was drawn
between religion and free speech and press rights. 79 It was claimed in the
Resolutions that if the federal government could encroach on state authority
to protect speech and press, then religion might be next. It seems that religion
was viewed as the quintessential example of an appropriate area for appli-
cation of federalism principles.
B. The Fourteenth Amendment
It would be inappropriate to claim that any specific church/state separation
policy emerged during the framing of the Bill of Rights. The two prevailing
doctrines inherited through the first amendment were the prominence of free
exercise as a fundamental right, and the importance of federalism in ensuring
that local religious policies would not be subverted by the whims of national
leaders.8 0 This understanding did not change prior to the Civil War."' Current
PETERSON, THE JEFFERSON IMAGE IN THE AM RacAN MIND 1463-65 (1960).
77. 8 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 42 (H. Washington ed. 1884), reprinted in W.
SKOUSEN, THE MAKING OF AMERICA, THE SUBSTANCE AND MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 687
(1985).
78. See Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. 1104, 1112-18 (S.D. Ala.), rev'd
sub nor. Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 472 U.S. 38 (1985), for a
discussion of the views of Madison and Jefferson and a review of establishment clause framing.
79. See 1789 KENTUCKY ACTS, 1st Sess., 7th Gen. Assembly (Nov. 10, 1798); 2 SHEPHERD,
ED., THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA 192-93 (1835); 4 ANNALS OF AMERICA 63 (1968).
80. The presumption that the first amendment's provisions properly restrain the executive
and judicial branches has never been seriously questioned. Surprisingly, it has also never been
comprehensively discussed. Early on, the framers made clear their broader understanding of
congressional injunction applicability throughout the federal government. In the Kentucky
resolution, Thomas Jefferson said "[church-state decision-making authority is] withheld from
the cognizance of Federal Tribunals," 4 THE ANNALS OF AMERICA 63 (1968). Justice Story
argued, "[A civil magistrate is] bound indeed to protect the established church ....... J.
STORY, supra note 29, at 591. Cf. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) (first amendment
applied to judicial proceedings).
81. Professor Howe states that "it was the unquestioned assumption of everyone before the
Civil War,... that the making of a controlling law with respect to the power of churches was
the responsibility of each state-never the federal government .... " M. HowE, supra note
14, at 70.
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applications of the establishment clause rely on the Fourteenth Amendment's
effects on the Bill of Rights. The legal question that remains, then, is whether
this Reconstruction amendment somehow transforms the federalist character
of the establishment clause.
1. Incorporation Doctrines
Ratified in 1868, the fourteenth amendment was designed to safeguard the
civil rights of recently emancipated black Americans.12 The amendment's
greatest effect on constitutional law, however, has occurred in the last fifty
years with the development of "incorporation" doctrines. While a better
case for incorporation can probably be made via the amendment's "privileges
and immunities" clause, current doctrine holds that the "due process" clause
incorporates many of the rights found in the first eight amendments and
thus makes them applicable to the states.8 3 The Supreme Court has never
unanimously agreed on one theory regarding incorporation, but the result
of its decisions has been a "selective incorporation" of most provisions in
the Bill of Rights. This "selective incorporation" has included the establish-
ment clause."4
For the last forty years the issue of Bill of Rights incorporation has been
the subject of fervent debate. Scholars have developed exegeses demonstrating
intent to prevent state encroachment on Bill of Rights protections and,
conversely, intent to guarantee only those rights subsumed by the earlier
Civil Rights Bill. 5 This Article does not attempt to enter the debate, but
82. See, e.g., M. CURTIS, supra note 39, at 56 (noting that petitions commonly reflected a
desire to safeguard the right to bear arms, free speech, the right of assembly and free press
for blacks). There were apparently no serious claims that blacks had been deprived of religious
liberty. Id.
83. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 49 (1985) (relying on due process clause to
incorporate first amendment); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) (jury instruction
impacting right to be free from self-incrimination was allowed though Court suggested more
fundamental rights might be incorporated).
84. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
85. Justice Black initiated debate with the view that the fourteenth amendment totally
incorporated the first eight amendments to the Constitution. See Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. 46, 68-123 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). Other commentators who argue in favor of
incorporation include: H. AaRAHM, FREEDOM AND THE COURT (1982); M. CURTIS, supra note
39; H. FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1908); H. HYMAN & W.
WIECEK, EQUAl JUSTICE UNDER LAW (1982); J. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT (1956); Avins, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights: The Crosskey-Fairman Debates
Revisited, 6. HARv. J. ON LEaIs. 1 (1968); Crosskey, Charles Fairman, 'Legislative History'
and the Constitutional Limitations on State Authority, 22 U. Cm. L. REV. 1 (1954); Curtis,
Further Adventures of the Nine-Lived Cat: A Response to Mr. Berger on Incorporation of the
Bill of Rights, 43 Omo ST. L.J. 89 (1982).
Commentators who argue against incorporation include: A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH 102 (1962); Alfange, On Judicial Policy Making and Constitutional Interpretation, 5
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 603 (1978); Berger, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth
Amendment: A Nine Lived Cat, 42 OHIo ST. L.J. 435 (1981); Fairman, Does the Fourteenth
Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? 2 STAN. L. Rav. 5 (1949); Kurland, The Irrelevance
of the Constitution: The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24
VI.L. L. REv. 3 (1978).
1990] 1205
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
instead presumes the validity of the Supreme Court's doctrine of "selective
incorporation" involving rights of a particularly "fundamental" nature.
Under selective incorporation, the question becomes one of whether the
establishment clause is properly catalogued as constituting a "fundamental
right."
2. The Establishment Clause Distinguished
On its face, the Court's decision to import nonestablishment as a "fun-
damental right" seems semantically difficult at best.8 6 Upon review of first
amendment history, however, such a construction is not only inappropriate,
but virtually prohibited. The only "right" embodied in the clause would be
the right to have one's state free to establish a religion. It is thus nonsensical
to incorporate the establishment clause in much the same way it would be
illogical to incorporate the tenth amendment.87 The clause is a specific
prohibition on the federal government which does not parallel an individual
right, but a state right."6 The individual right involved, namely religious
86. While other freedoms found in the first amendment can be seen as "privileges" or
"rights" under the fourteenth amendment with little semantic ingenuity, the establishment
clause is simply a restriction on the federal government. J. REICHLEY, supra note 5, at 135;
Paulsen, supra note 16, at 323. But see Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (concluding there
to be a fundamental personal right not to be a part of a community whose official organs
endorse religion); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 242 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (the establishment clause prohibits the state from inhibiting the "freedom of choice
by diminishing the attractiveness of either alternative . . .[sectarian vs. "religion-free" edu-
cation]); L. LEVY, supra note 13, at 168 (arguing "freedom of" incorporates "freedom from").
It is recognized that any restriction can be viewed as a right. It does not follow, however,
that protection of a right dictates that a given restriction (e.g., no establishment) should apply
with equal force to both federal and state governments. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl.
4. Limitations on the federal government's ability to tax individuals indirectly reflected an
individual right to be free from excessively burdensome taxation, but this structural provision
did not mean that states were equally enjoined from taxing citizens. Because state governments
more closely represented the people, their authority was greater. Federalism principles allocate
governmental authority to the level at which it can be most efficiently used in the best interests
of the people.
87. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the People." U.S. CONST. amend.
X. No one has argued that this amendment could or should be applied to the states. It is
conceivable that a state constitution might contain a similar provision which extended federalism
principles to protect towns or counties, but deriving such a mandate from the tenth amendment
would be semantically impossible. Likewise, a parallel to the establishment clause could con-
ceivably arise in a state constitution, but the appropriate meaning simply cannot be derived
from the first amendment. See W. RAWLE, A VEw OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 120-30 (1825) (arguing for application of the Bill of Rights against states
while excluding the first amendment from such application); Snee, supra note 16, at 372
(distinguishing establishment clause with respect to incorporation). Cf. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.
83, 129 n.18 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (suggesting that standing arguments regarding ninth
and tenth amendments would be similar to that for establishment clause).
88. Being true to the meaning of the establishment clause, to apply its principles to states
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liberty, is "protected" by the clause only through its ability to prevent
federal frustration of local legislative competence in religious matters. 9 A
court injunction against state action is exactly the frustration the establish-
ment clause attempted to preclude.
It should be emphasized that the free exercise clause is not shackled with
the same characteristics that makes establishment clause incorporation so
irrational. 90 Functionally, the establishment clause was designed to provide
states with an additional safeguard to complement the tenth amendment.
The free exercise clause, however, clearly contemplates a substantive right.
In fact, it was suggested in the First Congress that the states be required to
respect free exercise. More importantly, the free exercise right was universally
acknowledged at the framing of the first amendment and was constitutionally
protected in every state. Described by Madison as an "unalienable right,"
the free exercise principle clearly falls into the category of rights considered
"fundamental" at the framing and during the reconstruction. While free
exercise was probably seen as the most fundamental right, the nonestablish-
ment injunction was the single most explicit distribution of civil authority.
3. Incorporationist Arguments
Arguments in favor of general incorporation often rely on a premise that
Republicans in the 39th Congress believed that much of the Bill of Rights
already applied to states prior to the Civil War.9' This assumption presumably
explains the lack of incorporation discussion during the fourteenth amend-
ment's framing. Regardless of the argument's validity, it does little to salvage
establishment clause incorporation because at that time no one could have
reasonably believed the clause applied to states. 92 Indeed, it would seem that
any intent to incorporate some type of nonestablishment principle would, at
would mean restricting state authority to legislate in ways that might hamper local town and
city church establishments. The clause would possibly be worded, "States cannot legislate in
such a way as to benefit or hinder town or county religious establishments."
The unfortunate use of the word "respecting" can and has caused confusion in this regard.
See Paulsen, supra note 16, at 321 (term intended to prevent negative inferences, i.e., Congress
is not only enjoined from establishing a church, but also from disestablishing state churches).
Some state constitutional provisions which facially mirror the first amendment obviously intend
a different meaning for the word "respecting." Perhaps the cavalier use of the word in later
state constitutions reflected the narrow interpretation of "establishment" which earlier existed
at the federal level.
89. See T. CURRY, supra note 14, at 204-05 (discussing belief that established religion
violated free exercise).
90. See J. REICHLEY, supra note 5, at 135 (view that limiting incorporation of establishment
clause is inconsistent with extending free exercise clause is supported by "neither logic nor
experience"); Snee, supra note 16, at 371-73 (arguing against incorporating establishment clause
while allowing incorporation of free exercise clause).
91. See, e.g., M. CURns, supra note 39, at 43-47, 100-05.
92. Cf. Speech by Senator Bingham, CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1871) ("[T]his
amendment takes from no State any right that ever pertained to it.").
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the very least, first require an articulation of what that principle was. 93
Admittedly, the fourteenth amendment brought about major adjustments
in federalism concepts. The Bingham and Howard speeches before Congress,
which have been used to support the legitimacy of incorporation, reveal a
desire to arrest state encroachment on fundamental rights. 94 Religious estab-
lishment policies, however, were never violations of rights, but rather time-
honored methods for protecting those rights. In one speech by Senator
Howard, the list of rights he considered to be "privileges and immunities,"
excluded both nonestablishment and religious freedom. 95 Indeed, unlike the
racial problems which precipitated the reconstruction amendments, church
and state had become less entwined since the framing. Experience did not
call for a reworking of this area of constitutional law. Through democratic
procedures, religious groups were able to retain the ability to influence
government, while free exercise principles protected minority views. Any
congressional concerns would have had to focus on these free exercise rights.9 6
Congress' rejection of the Blaine amendment9 7 would appear to be dis-
positive on the issue. 9 Considered several times by both the House and the
93. See W. KATZ, supra note 61, at 11 ("The dearth of evidence as to the restrictions
imposed by the 'no establishment' clause in federal territory means a dearth of evidence as to
the meaning with which the clause was 'incorporated' (as the phrase goes) into the Fourteenth
Amendment."). Evidence suggests that what little late nineteenth century understandings of the
establishment clause there were narrowly construed the establishment restriction and then only
as a proscription against interference with state authority. See L. TRIBE, supra note 52, at 826
(discussion of narrow 19th century definition of establishment). Antebellum case law evidences
this understanding. See Terret v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 42 (1815) and Vidal v. Girard's
Executors, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127 (1844) (both suggesting a narrow definition of establishment).
94. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 151 (1871) (Bingham speech calling for a
rereading of Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) and its holding that the Bill of
Rights did not limit the states); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1064-65 (1866) (speech
espousing federal authority to enforce the Bill of Rights). While the argument presented here
seeks to distinguish only the establishment clause, it should not be forgotten that there is a
strong argument against accepting Bingham's views as dispositive of congressional understand-
ing. In reply to Bingham's rereading of Barron, opponents stated that he could "make," but
not "unmake," history. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 151 (1871).
95. CoNo. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765.
96. State legislatures kept no records of ratification debates-only journals of motions and
votes. See Fairman, supra note 85, at 82. Lack of state concern over a possible loss of church/
state authority is again significant, but the import is reduced by the fact that no state at the
time had an established religion, and no court had construed the clause to prohibit more than
that. Therefore, even if a state ratified a prohibition on actual establishments, they ratified no
more than that. See infra note 122.
97. See 4 CONG. REc. 5580 (1876). On December 14, 1875, Hon. James G. Blaine proposed
the amendment as part of a movement to protect the public school system from what was
perceived as a Catholic threat. President Grant had recommended such an amendment in his
December 7, 1875, message to Congress. The proposed amendment read:
No state shall make any law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; and no money raised by school taxation in any State, for
the support of public schools, or derived from any public fund therefor, nor any
public lands devoted thereto, shall ever be under the control of any religious sect;
1208 [Vol. 39:1191
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Senate, 99 the amendment was introduced only seven years after ratification
of the fourteenth amendment and would have explicitly prohibited any state
from establishing a religion.'°0 The proposal's repeated rejection was accom-
panied by argument extolling state performance in protecting religious liberty
and affirming the importance of federalism. 101 When proposed, congressional
ranks included six senators and eight congressmen who had participated in
drafting the fourteenth amendment. 102 All participants demonstrated a clear
understanding of state authority in the area of religion, 03 and during the
nor shall any money so raised, or lands so devoted, be divided between religious
sects or denominations.
Id. The amendment was eventually revised to include an injunction against the use of a broader
range of public assets to support religious teaching and a provision ensuring the continued use
of Bible-reading within public schools. Id. The proposed amendment was passed 180 to 7 in
the House, but lost the necessary two-thirds vote (28 to 16) in the Senate. After its rejection,
the tide turned the other way and there was a revival of government contribution to schools
under sectarian control as well as proposed constitutional amendments recognizing Christianity
nationally and petitions for federal Sunday-Rest legislation. See AMERICAN STATE ARTICLES 240-
60 (1961); M. HowE, supra note 14, at 130-31.
98. See O'Brien, The States and "No Establishment": Proposed Amendments to the Con-
stitution Since 1798, 4 WASHBURN L.J. 183, 186-96 (1965) for a discussion of what the
amendment meant with respect to understandings of the fourteenth amendment and incorpo-
ration. See also Berger, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights: A Reply to Michael Curtis'
Response, 44 OHIo ST. L.J. 1, 16-19 (1983) (arguing that Blaine amendment shows understanding
of the people to be nonincorporation).
99. M. MUSMANNO, PROPOSED AmENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION 182-83 (1929) (reporting
that the bill had been reintroduced twenty times by 1929).
100. It has been argued that the proposed amendment may prove too much in that it would
have enjoined state infringement of free exercise. See Abington School Dist.v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 257 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). This argument is unpersuasive, however,
considering the clear primary purpose of restricting state aid to parochial schools. Such a
purpose is only fulfilled by a nonestablishment provision.
101. 4 CoNo. REc. 5585 (1876). See O'Brien, supra note 98, at 186. See also Comment, The
Blaine Amendment and the Bill of Rights, 64 HARv. L. REV. 939 (1951) (discussion of numerous
proposals and rejections).
102. See Comment, supra note 101, at 942 n.14 (listing Senators and Congressmen who
participated in both debates). Additionally, thirty-seven other representatives in the 44th Con-
gress had been in legislative bodies of different states when the fourteenth amendment was
debated for ratification. O'Brien, supra note 98, at 190.
103. Ironically, opposition to the proposed amendment relied on the thoughts of the same
Thomas Jefferson who is cited as best articulating the necessity of strict separation. Senator
Stevenson stated:
Friend as [Jefferson] was of religious freedom, he would never have consented that
the states, which brought the Constitution into existence, upon whose sovereignty
this instrument rests, which keep it within its expressly limited powers, should be
degraded and that the Government of the United States, a Government of united
authority, the mere agent of the States with prescribed powers, should undertake
to take possession of their schools and their religion.
4 CoGo. REc. 5589 (1876) (statement of Sen. Stevenson). But see M. CURTIS, supra note 39,
at 169-70 (arguing Blaine Amendment was reaction to Supreme Court cases and meant nothing
with respect to incorporation or the framing of the fourteenth amendment).
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
debate, it was never intimated that the fourteenth amendment had any impact
on a state's legislative competence with respect to religion. °'0
Moreover, the principle objection of opponents to the Blaine amendment,
namely that it was "much better ... to leave the State Governments to
themselves,"' 05 was the same objection to Madison's 1789 proposal requiring
free exercise within states. Through decades of reconsideration of Blaine-
type amendments, it was never argued that the first amendment of the
Constitution could be applied against the states.' ° With respect to the
establishment clause, such a suggestion would have simply made no sense.
By incorporating the establishment clause, the Supreme Court has assumed
that the people of this nation wish to constitutionally require a policy that
they have repeatedly and explicitly rejected. Some commentators have said
that history, while not mandating incorporation, does permit it.107 Individual
rights rhetoric in the debates and the general thrust of the fourteenth
amendment's privileges and immunities clause may indeed permit federal
protection of the free exercise right, but this authority could not include
permission to create a completely new meaning for the establishment clause.
Not only has the federal nature of the clause been lost, but the entire concept
of disestablishment has been expanded beyond anything even suggested at
either the Framing or the Reconstruction.0 8 This is especially significant
considering the fact that the new interpretation effectively destroys federal-
ism,1°9 the principal mechanism for protecting religious liberty.
While many specific Bill of Rights incorporations have been criticized,
none are so thoroughly contradicted by the historically discernible intentions
of our forefathers than that of the establishment clause.110 In 1865, as in
104. See, e.g., 4 CoNo. REc. 5561 (1876) (Sen. Frelinghuysen speech) ("[The Blaine Amend-
ment would] prohibit . . .the states for the first time, from establishment of religion."); M.
Howa, supra note 14, at 88 (arguing that 44th Congress thought states to be constitutionally
immune from nonestablishment proscriptions). The only reference to the fourteenth amendment
during the Blaine Amendment debate was in referring to an example of another poorly drafted
amendment, lacking in specificity. 4 CoNo. REC. 5585 (1876).
105. 1 ANNALS 755 (1789). Compare with 4 CONG. REC. 5245, 5246, 5262, 5268, and 5580-
95 (1876).
106. O'Brien, supra note 98, at 200.
107. See supra note 17.
108. Accepting arguendo incorporation's alteration of the constitutional scheme, Lawrence
Tribe states, "it remains at best ironic and at worst perverse to appeal to this history of the
establishment clause to strike at practices only remotely resembling establishment in any core
sense of the concept." L. TRIBE, supra note 52, at 819.
109. But see generally L. LEvy, supra note 13 (arguing that religious liberty was historically
tied to church/state separation). This claim is controverted by colonial history. See generally
J. REicm.EY, supra note 5. With numerous diverse religions to accommodate, it made more
sense to have church/state decisionmaking authority in the hands of those who would be
affected by it. The goal was not "separation," but instead enfranchisement of as many religious
views as possible.
110. Incorporation of the establishment clause is inconsistent with all theories regarding Bill
of Rights incorporation. Even under full incorporation, the establishment clause must be viewed,
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1791, the American people realized that questions of religious establishment
were best left to states and local authorities. " ' They saw wisdom in the
theory that as government became more distant and centralized, the power
to legislate with respect to the establishment of religion should diminish.
Looking at the current situation, however, it seems this principle has been
reversed.
II. SUPREME COURT FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
Who controls the past controls the future,
who controls the present controls the past.
-George Orwell, 19492
But the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself
and not what we have said about it.
-Justice Felix Frankfurter, 193913
A. Doctrinal Development
Everson v. Board of Education began the Supreme Court's conflict with
state governments by declaring that the fourteenth amendment incorporated
the establishment clause so as to make it applicable as a restriction against
the states." 4 Everson's progeny shows that states were thereby required to
create a "wall of separation" between religion and government. Discussion
within the Everson opinion focuses primarily on the definition of "an
establishment of religion," and not on the appropriateness of incorpora-
tion."' Justice Black, an advocate of total incorporation, apparently saw no
like the tenth amendment, as a provision which has no sensible application against states. See
text accompanying note 61. Arguments proceed a fortiori with respect to selective incorporation
or specific incorporation theories. But cf. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
257 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that mere "inattention" may have caused the
fourteenth amendment's draftsmen to neglect explicating the nexus between the new amendments
and the guarantees of the first amendment).
111. As in the case of the first amendment, ratification debates give only scant evidence in
support of any popularly held view of incorporation. M. CURTIS, supra note 39, at 145-48.
112. G. ORWELL, 1984 (1949), reprinted in C. WOODWARD, AmmEucAN ATTITUDES TOWARD
HISTORY 20 (1968).
113. Graves v. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 491-92 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
114. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Prior to the Reconstruction, the Supreme Court clearly understood
the limited applicability of both religion clauses in the first amendment. See Cummings v.
Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866) (provision for protecting citizens of respective states in
their religious liberties is left to the state constitutions and laws); Permoli v. Municipality No.
1, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 588, 609 (1845) (same).
115. "This case forces us to determine squarely for the first time what was 'an establishment
of religion' in the First Amendment's conception; . . ." Everson, 330 U.S. at 29. While this
Article criticizes Everson for its role in incorporating the establishment clause, it should be
noted that, at the time of the decision, commentators generally focused instead on Everson's
definition of establishment. M. KONITZ, supra note 32, at 56. Incorporation was only an
academic concern if establishment remained narrowly defined. See Snee, supra note 16, at 406
(concluding that incorporation of the establishment clause would become a problem only if the
Court invalidated a state law).
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need to explain the basis for including the establishment clause among those
which had been assimilitated. The Court's only rationale extended from
obiter dictum in the 1939 Cantwell v. Connecticut decision which incorpo-
rated the free exercise clause. 1 6 Citing free exercise incorporation and the
complimentary nature of the clauses, Black simply stated, "there is every
reason to give the same application .. . to the establishment of religion
clause. '"" 7 The logical deficiency is manifest, yet after forty years the Court
has never justified its interpretation. Perhaps Justice Stewart explained it
best when he stated: "[T]he Fourteenth Amendment has somehow absorbed
the Establishment Clause.""'
Historical analysis in defense of Supreme Court interpretations has regu-
larly focused on the views of Madison and Jefferson with respect to church/
state relations in Virginia." 9 Criticism of the Court's rationale has curiously
sought to refine understanding of this same limited topic by pointing to
inconsistencies in a total separation theory.2 0 This criticism, while perhaps
justified, misses the mark. Far more serious error can be found in the
Court's focus in general. By looking solely to Madison and Jefferson, the
Supreme Court has effectively imputed one state's historical treatment of
religious establishment to an entire nation.12' Compounded error is revealed
by asking what theory of disestablishment would have been understood by
the fourteenth amendment's framers who supposedly "incorporated" the
establishment clause. Few would argue that by that time a Jeffersonian "wall
of separation" had been commonly accepted. Antebellum case law better
supports a nonpreferentialist'2 2 reading of the clause. 23 Ironically, it was the
116. 310 U.S. 295 (1939). Cantwell's incorporation of the free exercise clause is arguably
permissible based on the general doctrines inherent in the fourteenth amendment. See supra
text accompanying note 90. These doctrines, however, do not permit the comparable extension
of nonestablishment principles seen in Everson.
117. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15. For a detailed criticism of the Court's reliance on previous
cases, see Snee, supra note 16, at 400-04.
118. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 310 (1963) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Justice Stewart then points to the irony in restricting states with a clause "designed to leave
states free to go there own way." Id.
119. See Kruse, The Historical Meaning and Judicial Construction of the Establishment of
Religion Clause of the First Amendment, 2 WASHBURN L.J. 65, 139-41 (1962) (arguing that the
first amendment reflects neither Madison nor Jefferson's views on church/state relations). Kruse
also identifies the inadequate historical basis for incorporation but sanctions it based on an
expansive understanding of judicial review. Id. at 141.
Some say that Court reliance on Madison and Jefferson is justified by the fact that they
were the most brilliant, prolific church state theorists of their day. This may be true, but even
their views differed, and both understood that the policies they espoused were not necessarily
appropriate for all states. Both likewise understood the establishment clause to be about
federalism, not proper church/state relations. See D. DRiISBACH, supra note 16, at 107-11.
120. See supra note 14.
121. It should be noted that Black's source in the Memorial and Remonstrance was not even
a state constitution, but merely a statute. P. MILLER, supra note 49, at 98 (1953).
122. Nonpreferentialism is a popular view among Supreme Court critics which interprets the
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purpose of facilitating state-based solutions to church/state problems which
precipitated the establishment clause.
Total separation of church and state is an ill-conceived notion which, at
its logical extreme, cannot coexist with religious liberty. 24 More recent cases
following Lemon v. Kurtzman recognize this and have attempted to deal
with the tensions through a three-pronged test-a test which has notably
never been applied to federal legislation.'25 The Lemon Court's three step
analysis of questioned legislation includes: scrutiny of a law's intent, its
primary effects, and the extent of consequent church/state entanglement.
None of these considerations speak to the "right" of free exercise. Neither
do they acknowledge any of the federalism concerns found in the establish-
ment clause. Their only foundations lie in an incomplete exegesis of Thomas
Jefferson's writings.
B. Emerging Conflicts: The Prospect for Change
[Ihf the policy of the government upon vital questions affecting the whole
people, is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court....
the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent
practically resigned their government into the hands of that eminent tri-
bunal.
-Abraham Lincoln, 1861126
establishment clause to call for government neutrality with respect to various churches or
religious denominations, but not necessarily a complete separation of government and religion
generally or neutrality between religion and irreligion. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 482 U.S.
38, 106 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (establishment clause did not require "neutrality
between religion and irreligion nor did it prohibit the federal government from providing non-
discriminatory aid to religion"); J. REICmLEY, supra note 5, at 166 (first amendment is not
neutral on the value of religion). See also J. DRAPER & F. WATSON, supra note 28, at 99
(describing the Baptist position as one of "separation of Church and State, not separation of
Christianity or the Bible and the State"); Corwin, The Supreme Court as National School
Board, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 10 (1949) (the Supreme Court's doctrine on the
unconstitutionality of government aid to all religions is "untrue historically ... all [the
establishment clause] does is to forbid Congress to give any religious faith, sect, or denomination
a preferred status" (emphasis in original)). Justice Story once said:
Few persons would think it unreasonable to encourage or foster the Christian
religion generally as a matter of sound policy .... Indeed, in a republic, there
would seem to be a peculiar propriety in viewing the Christian religion as the great
basis on which it must rest for its support and permanence.
J. STORY, supra note 29, at 603-05. Story went on to claim that the "universal sentiment of
America at the founding was that Christianity ought to receive encouragement from the states."
Id. at 605.
123. See J. REICHLEY, supra note 5, at 115 (discussing various court decisions holding
"general" Christianity to be part of common law).
124. See L. TRIBE, supra note 52, at 815; Laycock, Towards A General Theory of the
Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy,
81 COLUM. L. REv. 1373, 1374 (1981).
125. 403 U.S. 602 (1971); see also Edwards v. Aguillard, 480 U.S. 578 (1987) (three-prong
test used to strike down "creation science" statute).
126. 2 ABRAHAM LINCOLN: COMPLETE WORKS 5 (J. Nicolay & J. Hay eds. 1920) (First
Inaugural Address, delivered in 1861).
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Justice Stewart, in his dissent to Abington School District v. Schempp, 2 7
acknowledged the establishment clause's status as a protector of state au-
thority and the "uncomfortable" nature of incorporation. Unfortunately,
he was never able to obtain support from other members of the Court and
his criticisms received little attention. Years of unsatisfactory adjudication
have bequeathed us the wisdom of experience, however, and several of
today's justices have begun to see both the historical error and the policy
misjudgments inherent in current establishment clause jurisprudence . 21
Justice O'Connor has several times expressed misgivings about the Court's
Lemon test.129 Justice Rehnquist has also pointed to the Court's accumulated
errors on more than one occasion. In his dissent to Wallace v. Jaffree, °3 0
Rehnquist identified the inconsistent application of prayer restrictions with
respect to federal and state actions.13' Without rejecting incorporation per
se, he recognized the tension inherent in current doctrines and provided
historical analysis which gave credence to a lower court claim that the
establishment clause was wrongly incorporated. Justice Scalia also suggested
a step away from incorporation and toward federalism when he stressed the
value and importance of deference to state judgment in his dissent to Edwards
v. Aguillard.132 Scalia, again without going so far as to reject incorporation,
noted that the very reason the federal government was prohibited from
establishing a religion was to safeguard state religious policy-making. Justice
White joined the ranks of the discontent in his dissent to Wallace v. Jaffree. 113
After acknowledging his appreciation for Justice Rehnquist's historical anal-
ysis, Justice White stated: "Against that history, it would be quite under-
127. 374 U.S. 203, 286 (1962) (Brennan, J., concurring).
128. Besides judicial figures, the public has also demonstrated an increasing dissatisfaction
with the gradual erosion of our Judeo-Christian roots. Twenty-eight years ago, John F.
Kennedy's campaign assured the electorate that his religion would not influence American
politics. All three candidates in 1980 declared themselves to be ardent Christians. See F.
COLUMBO, GOD IN AMERICA 2 (1984). The public reaction to Supreme Court establishment
clause policies has had currency in Congress as well. In the 97th Congress there were attempts
to restrict federal court jurisdiction in two important areas implicating church/state policy:
school prayer and abortion. Proponents of the restrictions apparently thought state tribunals
would be more appropriate fora for issues of morality and religion. P. BATOR, D. MELTZER,
P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER's, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
378 (3d ed. 1988).
129. Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 346 (1987) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 68 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice
O'Connor instead proffers an effects test which looks to the result of legislation as opposed to
the intent or entanglement. It should be noted that O'Connor has expressed general dissatis-
faction with current doctrines and not specific concerns regarding incorporation.
130. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
131. Id. at 103-05 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
132. 482 U.S. 578, 610 (1987). Justice Scalia also alluded to other potential arguments,
stating, "I will not go on to discuss the fact that, even if the Louisiana legislature's purpose
were exclusively to advance religion, some of the well established exceptions ... might be
applicable." Id. at 635 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
133. 472 U.S. 38, 91 (1985).
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standable if we undertook to reassess our cases dealing with these Clauses,
particularly those dealing with the Establishment Clause."'13 4 Finally, the
newest member of the Court most pithily confirmed the Court's malaise in
Allegheny v. ACLU.'35 Justice Kennedy, stressing the fact that "he did not
wish to be seen as advocating [Lemon]", simply stated, "substantial revision
of our Establishment Clause doctrine may be in order."
'
'
3 6
Though it is not being asserted that any Justice is currently rethinking
establishment clause incorporation, the presence of dissatisfaction may open
some doors. In 1984, Judge Brevard Hand explicitly addressed the issue and
called for disincorporation of the establishment clause.' Unfortunately,
Judge Hand's historical argument led to the conclusion that incorporation
in general was unconstitutional. Hand's chutzpa was met by a unanimous
Supreme Court rejection of the idea that "the Federal Constitution imposes
no obstacle to Alabama's establishment of religion."
Clearly, Everson was wrongly reasoned, but proper historical analysis need
not go so far as to reject incorporation generally. Instead, it must only reject
incorporation of the establishment clause.'38 Likewise, disincorporation need
not remove all obstacles to state establishment; free exercise jurisprudence
can invalidate establishments which undermine religious liberty. Most im-
portantly, the argument for disincorporation need not rely solely on original
intent and the judicial philosophies which place a premium on it. The final
section of this Article identifies significant policy benefits of the federalist
scheme.
While several Justices have admittedly assumed a posture of absolute
intransigence on the issue, the possibility of reversing establishment clause
incorporation should not be treated as a dead issue. Changes in the Court
and its continued inability to develop a cohesive body of law portend a
significant movement in the future. Discreet adjustments to the Lemon test,
however, are not the answer. The Court, instead, must realize that it has
failed to devise a comprehensive and coherent nonestablishment theory for
one simple reason: there is none. The framers understood this truth. They
realized that in an area where passionately held values varied so radically,
134. Id. at 91 (White, J., dissenting).
135. 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989).
136. Id. at 3134 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
137. See Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. 1104, 1112-22 (S.D. Ala.), rev'd
sub nom. Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526 (1 lth Cir. 1983), aff'd, 472 U.S. 38 (1985). Instead
of distinguishing the establishment clause, Hand simply accepted the popular views of Charles
Fairman and Raoul Berger regarding the paucity of evidence for any incorporation theory. See
supra note 85. The persuasiveness of these arguments should not be understated; but of equal,
if not greater importance, especially from a policy perspective, are the federalism concerns
subsumed within the first amendment which make incorporation of the establishment clause
not only historically unlikely, but logically impossible.
138. See Snee, supra note 16, at 372 (arguing against incorporation of the establishment
clause while sanctioning incorporation generally).
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only local government could effectively handle the delicate policy questions
that were implicated.
III. ESTABLISHMENT TODAY: THE POLICY ARGUMENT
A judge who does not with some regularity reach judgments that conflict
with his private policy views is not confronting complicated constitutional
questions with sufficient disinterestedness or intellectual rectitude.
-Leonard Levy, 1986 39
Since the Supreme Court has rejected textual historical evidence as a basis
for abandoning its position regarding establishment clause incorporation, the
remaining justification must be found in some intrinsic value based solely
on policy considerations. 140 That intrinsic value does not exist.
A. Federalism Forgotten
Several legal historians and commentators have reached similar negative
conclusions regarding the constitutionality of establishment clause incorpo-
ration.' 41 These critics, however, have failed to call for its rollback because
they identify only a lack of historical justification and not the underlying
principles of federalism which make state authority worthy of pursuit. They
advocate subtle refinements to separationist theories which are more palatable
to nonpreferentialists but do equal injustice to legal history and the protec-
tions of federalism. 42 Eschewing the logical conclusions of their own argu-
ments, commentators have concluded their criticisms with the impotent
assertion that incorporation is a fait accompli.143
This treatment of the issue is inadequate. Establishment clause incorpo-
ration is not merely an example of constitutionally questionable activism.'"
139. L. LEvy, supra note 13, at 164.
140. Of course the Court never asserts policy, but only history, for its church/state decisions.
A. SUTHERLAND, THE CHURCH SHALL BE FREE 28 (1965).
141. See E. CORWIN, supra note 14, at 116 (historically there is no basis for incorporation
of the establishment clause); Snee, supra note 16, at 406-07 (incorporation of the establishment
clause into the fourteenth amendment has no firm basis in history or logic).
142. See, e.g., Note, The Establishment Clause, Secondary Religious Effects and Humanistic
Education, 91 YALE L.J. 1196 (1982). See also L. TIBE, supra note 52, at 828 (promoting an
"arguably religious" test for the free exercise clause and an "arguably non-religious" test for
the establishment clause).
143. See, e.g., Kurland, supra note 14, at 11; Paulsen, supra note 16, at 317. Paulsen, for
example, refers to incorporation as a fait accompli after earlier discussing the "nonsensical"
nature of incorporation because "the original intention behind the establishment clause ...
[was] to prevent federal interference with a state's choice of whether or not to have an official
state religion." Paulsen, like others, is unsatisfied with the Court's treatment of the establishment
clause vis-a-vis incorporation, but does not espouse or even consider a rollback. See also E.
CORWIN, supra note 14, at 14 (vehemently attacks incorporation but does not call for its
rollback); J. REICHLEY, supra note 5, at 157 (rollback is not now "in the judicial or political
cards").
144. See R. BERGER, supra note 21, at 412-13 (calling for the rollback of Bill of Rights
incorporation generally to protect against the uncontrolled oligarchic judiciary). Berger's ar-
guments proceed afortiori in the area of establishment clause incorporation.
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It is, more importantly, bad policy. The Court's disregard of federalist
motivations with respect to the establishment clause not only leads to a
tortured interpretation, but also to the forfeiture of a fundamental safeguard
for preserving religious liberty. The unique efficacy of federalism as a
protector of religious rights is as credible today as it was in the eighteenth
century. 145 A careful historical analysis of the establishment clause, therefore,
not only reveals one more problem with the Supreme Court's treatment of
this very labyrinthine area of law,146 it also provides a solution.
B. Problems with Current Doctrines
To understand the competence of federalism in preserving liberty, it is
first important to comprehend the peculiar nature of the religious establish-
ment problem. This Article agrees with the position of numerous scholars
who have concluded that current separationist147 doctrines often operate in
opposition to the principles of tolerance, neutrality and accommodation
which they purport to sustain. 
14
1. Inherent Tension
The most commonly recognized problem regarding church/state legal issues
is the innate tension between free exercise and nonestablishment policies.1 49
For example, in Thomas v. Review Board, 150 the Court invalidated an Indiana
145. See L. TamE, supra note 52, at 834 ("Religion clauses embody a concept of the
relationship between religion and state which must be modified to adapt to changing conceptions
of both religion and of government."). But cf. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 240 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that regardless of the failings of any legalistic
justification for incorporation, current separationist policies are justified by the changing
demographics, politics, and social opinions).
146. An additional cost of establishment clause incorporation is the unnecessary expenditure
of federal court time and resources. "The Court has plunged boldly-some would say reck-
lessly-into the thicket of complex relationships involving religion, civil society, and the indi-
vidual." J. REicILaY, supra note 5, at 117.
147. It is recognized that strict separationism has theoretically been rejected by the Court.
However, this Article continues to counter the separationist arguments since they inhabit and
animate all current disestablishment theories. Abernathy cites the popularity of separationism
thus: "The establishment clause of the First Amendment has long since been replaced in the
general literature and in the popular mind to become simply a guarantee of separation of
church and state." M. ABERNATHY, Crvn. LIBERTIES UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 249 (1968).
148. "The decisions of the Supreme Court on the use of Bible-reading and prayer in public
schools have stirred protest and controversy to an extent rarely equaled in the history of the
Court." Id. at 263. The continued veracity of this statement is evidenced in the emphasis placed
on candidate opinions regarding school prayer during the 1988 elections.
149. The Court in Waltz v. New York Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970), described
its goal as such: "to find a neutral course between the two Religion Clauses, both of which
are cast in absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend
to clash with the other." Cf. JusncE HuGo BLACK AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 53 (E. Dennis,
D. Gilmore & D. Grey eds. 1982) (arguing that Justice Black's desire for absolutes does not
work with respect to religion).
150. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
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unemployment compensation law that made no allowance for individuals
who left their jobs for religious reasons. In dissent, Justice Rehnquist
highlighted the potential result of the "tension" when he argued that the
Court's reading of the free exercise clause directly conflicted with its previ-
ously developed establishment clause jurisprudence: a law permitting benefits
for persons who leave employment for religious motivations could be found
to violate the establishment clause.'51 There is an obscure line between
constitutionally mandated accommodation and constitutionally prohibited
establishment.
Lawrence Tribe has suggested that current policies may sharpen tensions
by leaning too heavily on nonestablishment theory. 52 Tribe believes that the
clauses should be interpreted such that they are "at least compatible and at
best mutually supportive."' 53 The protections of federalism are not restored,
however, by merely diminishing the influence of the establishment clause.
As long as nonestablishment is seen as a correlative "right" in itself, conflict
cannot be avoided. 154
Both incorporation and the emergence of the welfare state have served to
exacerbate the tension between free exercise and nonestablishment.' s" Spe-
cifically, incorporation has greatly expanded the instances in which various
state policies might come into conflict with the Supreme Court's nonesta-
151. 450 U.S. at 725. See also Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327
(1987) (Title 7 exemption for religious institutions passed as a free exercise accommodation yet
unsuccessfully attacked as an establishment clause violation). Compare Mozert v. Hawkins
County Public Schools, 647 F. Supp. 1194 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) (parents bring action for free
exercise exemption from reading text book series which expunged Christian references), rev'd,
827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987) with Smith v. Board of School Comm'r, 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir.
1987) (similar texts attacked as an establishment of secular humanism). It should be noted that
the very "expunging" which was questioned in Mozert may have been required to avoid
establishment clause violations.
152. L. TRIBE, supra note 52, at 819. "Whenever a free exercise claim conflicts with an
absolute non-establishment theory, the support of the former would be more faithful to the
consensus present at the time of the Constitutional Convention and of the First Congress." Id.
153. Id. at 812. There has been a push by some toward avoiding the problem of free exercise-
nonestablishment tension by melding the two religion clauses into one cohesive religious liberty
philosophy. See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 16, at 331-50. While such theories often comport
more closely with original intent than do separationist theories, melding the clauses into a single
consistent philosophy only makes sense at the national level. A more accurate understanding
of the religion clauses, as they apply to government generally, necessitates a restoration of the
distinction between them. See Laycock, supra note 124, at 1373 (first step in defining the issue
is to restore the fundamental distinction between the clauses).
154. Compare Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223, 237 (2d Cir. 1985) (upholding the military
chaplaincy as required to protect free exercise rights of military personnel) with Note, Military
Mirrors on the Wall: Nonestablishment and the Military Chaplaincy, 95 YA.E L.J. 1210 (1986)
(conceding the free exercise requirement in principle, but proffering a scheme which would
ameliorate the inherent nonestablishment violation in the chaplaincy).
155. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 721 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing
incorporation and the emergence of the welfare state as two factors which have exacerbated
the tension between the free exercise and nonestablishment clauses).
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blishment policy. Likewise, the rapid growth of government has significantly
increased the likelihood, and perhaps even the necessity, of church/state
interaction.
The emergence of the welfare state not only highlights the inherent tension
discussed here, it aggravates the other problems discussed below. America
is no longer a nation whose government plays a very limited role in the daily
lives of its citizens. 56 Today, there are myriad government programs which
must each respect the fundamental right to free exercise," 7 as well as satisfy
the standards of Lemon. Tribe states regarding the religion clauses: "Those
guarantees were originally forged in a context where both the idea of state
and the concept of religion were fairly well defined and quite narrowly
limited."'' 8 Indeed, each statement by Thomas Jefferson espousing some
form of church/state separation is viewed with a jaundiced eye if not
balanced by his numerous speeches in support of limited government and
state sovereignty. 5 9 This is the very reason why Jefferson was so careful to
differentiate state and nation with respect to church/state policies.' 6 As
government increasingly interfaces with the most intimate aspects of peoples's
lives, the need for religious involvement is elevated if liberty is to be
maintained. '61
In the last forty years, the "wall" of separation has not only been made
higher and more impregnable; it has been moved. School curriculum, for
example, once arguably on the church side of the wall, is now clearly on
the state side. 62 When two spheres of authority overlap, they cannot be
separated by a wall. 63
156. Bernard Schwartz states,
When the Constitution and the Bill of Rights were written, government was only
an arbiter, allowing the individual to go unrestrained except at extreme limits of
conduct. In the almost two centuries that followed, the system gradually shifted to
one in which government had a positive duty to promote the welfare of the
community, even at the cost of individual rights. From a constitutional, as well as
from a political point of view, the welfare state has become an established fact.
B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 25, at 226.
157. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (disallowing refusal of unemployment
compensation for religious commitment regarding Saturday work).
158. L. TRIBE, supra note 52, at 812.
159. "[Tihe true barriers of our liberty in this country are the State governments." Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to A.L.C. Destutt de Tracy (Jan. 26, 1811), quoted in T. JEFFERSON,
WRITINGS 1245 (M. Peterson, ed. 1984). See generally T. JEFFERSON, THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON
(G. Chinard, ed. 1943).
160. See supra text accompanying notes 72-79.
161. See J. REicHLEY, supra note 5, at 243-346 for a discussion of 20th century society's
impact on religion in America.
162. See id. at 135-36 (discussing how 19th century America identified education with religion
"almost as a matter of course").
163. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 602-05 (1983) (racial policy
of religious organization overlaps with racial policy of government).
1990] 1219
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
2. Biased Neutrality
An open foe may prove a curse,
But a pretended friend is worse.
-John Gay, 1959'1
He that is not with me is against me.
-Jesus Christ65
A second problem deriving from current establishment clause application
is the fact that separationist policies, in the name of neutrality, are inherently
biased against religious viewpoints. 66 Long understood by various "funda-
mentalist" religious groups, acknowledgment of the subordination of relig-
ious values has recently become apparent even to leading liberal scholars
and judges. 167
Edwards v. Aguillard illustrates this difficulty. 68 By invalidating a Louis-
iana law requiring that "scientific creationism" be taught alongside evolu-
tion, the Court not only questioned the sincerity of state legislators who
claimed a secular purpose, it also offended the religious convictions of those
164. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 318 (1959), overruled, Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966).
165. Matthew 12:30.
166. See J. REICHELEY, supra note 5, at 415. Reichley describes seven value systems: four
religious and three secular. He claims that current constitutional law favors the latter three,
but concludes that these secular value systems do not provide moral basis sufficient to maintain
the cohesion and vitality of a free society. He also concludes that George Washington, John
Adams, and Thomas Jefferson came to the same realization.
167. See, e.g., Carter, Evolution, Creationism and Treating Religion as a Hobby, 1987 DUKE
L.J. 977 (exposing contradictions in liberal theory of neutrality toward religion). Professor
Carter issues a warning to the "liberal activists" who seek merely to maintain strict separation
but effectively undermine religion by discounting religious views in relation to more "rationally"
derived secular views. He correctly discerns that this represents the same kind of discrimination
which previously informed the liberal movement. Why is it appropriate for a member of a
legislative body to propose stricter pornography laws because of feminist interests, yet it is
inappropriate to base the proposal on its offensive nature with respect to God or some set of
religious norms? Such a distinction can hardly be said to uphold neutrality and accommodation
of religious values. See also Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952) (disinterested
insensitivity exhibited by the state toward religion is a subtle form of hostility); McConnell,
Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SuP. CT. REv. 1, 15 (separation can effectively deny
possibility of God's existence). Cf. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 H~Av. L. REV.
4, 33 (1983) (groups understandably take different constitutional positions to "maintain the
jurisgenerative capacity of the community's distinct law"). Cover goes on to argue that the
problem regarding the jurispathic function of courts is not "unclear" law but "too much law."
Different interpretive communities will generate "distinctive responses to any normative problem
of substantial complexity." Id. at 42. For example, Bob Jones University established a normative
community entitled to protection against statist encroachment. Bob Jones Univ. v. United
States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (denial of tax exempt status due to racist policies). The university
position was backed by Amish, Mennonite, Baptist and Jewish organizations due to "paideic
autonomy" of religious community in education of young. Cover, supra, at 62.
168. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
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who simply believed creationism to be true. 16 9 Some argue that free exercise
can be maintained since religious instruction can be given in the home or at
church.' 70 However, any such proscription does violence to religiously mo-
tivated instruction, even outside the classroom. One would be understandably
hesitant to explain to a child that while the religiously informed viewpoint
in fact represents the truth, it cannot be taught at school; yet, a fallacious
"scientific" theory is appropriate for the classroom, but should not be
believed. 7 Current separationist doctrines effectively discount this kind of
religiously informed perspective. 72 Far from being "neutral," this type of
separationist policy effectively degrades religion to the status of an irrational
hobby. 171
3. Nonestablishment's Establishment
The greatest question of our time is not communism versus individualism,
not Europe versus America, not even the East versus the West; it is
whether men can live without God.
-Will Durant"'
The third problem follows as a corollary from the second. To the religious
person, the secular philosophy which has ousted his or her spiritual viewpoint
169. The Court seems to have made an assumption that the religious interests involved are
not represented by a desire for truth, but a desire to inculcate religious beliefs and thus subvert
the secular interests of non-religious children. Id. at 593.
170. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
171. This same argument was used by the Court to support the idea that even nonmandatory
school prayer subverts the interests of nonreligious school children. Abington, 374 U.S. at 203.
Cf. Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908) (religious convictions mandated the mingling of
religious and secular studies); Cover, supra note 164, at 25-35 (discussing how various groups
use universally accepted devices to create a nomos, "an integrated world of obligation and
reality from which the rest of the world is perceived"). F
172. Some would argue that "secular" subjects can be differentiated from the religious. Such
arguments, however, necessarily cabin one's religious views. Cf. Smith v. Board of Educ., 655
F. Supp. 939, 966 (S.D. Ala. 1987), rev'd, 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987) (Dr. Kennedy testified
there was no distinction between secular and sacred).
173. See Carter, supra note 164. Again, the welfare state has diminished government's ability
to remain neutral due to the increased occasion for government financial support of various
religious institutions. In the eighteenth century, many believed such support to be a clear way
to "establish" a church. Justice Douglas said that, "The most effective way to establish any
institution is to finance it." Abington, 374 U.S. at 229 (Douglas, J., concurring). As Paulsen
points out, in the modern state, the best way to "disparage any institution is to deny it financial
benefits to which others are entitled as a matter of course." Paulsen, supra note 16, at 354-
55. Many social institutions putting forward secularist views are recipients of government funds.
Separationist prohibitions against similar religious organization support obviously contribute to
an unfair situation. But cf. Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334-40
(1987) (establishment clause leaves room for "benevolent neutrality" including section 702 tax
exemption despite discriminatory hiring policy); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 672-74
(1970) (allowing property tax exemption); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 241-49 (1968)
(allowing loan of books to parochial school children).
174. See C. COLSON, KINGDOMS IN CONFLICT 225 (1987).
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is equally "religious" as far as it controverts truth. 17 Thus, to the creationist,
evolution can represent one component of a secular religion, or, "secular
humanism.' ' 7 6 Courts have recognized secular humanism as a religion on
several occasions, 17 and have thus acknowledged the difficulty of applying
a broad separationist principle to a narrowly defined concept of religion.' 78
This inverted situation, which favors irreligion, undermines positive aspects
of the establishment clause which ideally should promote voluntarism and
thus force religion or irreligion to prosper based only on intrinsic merit.1 79
Various theories have offered two equally inadequate solutions to the
problem. Treating secular humanism as a religion by prohibiting its estab-
lishment might seem to preserve desired neutrality, but the expanding role
of the welfare state would make the task absurdly difficult. As government's
involvement in social programs increases, so does the likelihood of overlap-
ping secular and religious interest.8 0 Likewise, the nonpreferentialist conten-
tion that the establishment clause was never intended to favor irreligion over
religion may be historically accurate, but it leads to an inconsistency in
theory which discriminates against atheistic views.' Absolute separation of
175. See F. COLUMBO, supra note 128, at 153 (1984) ("More and more, the neo-Christians
[and the new right] have been quoting [Everson] to support their allegations that the nation's
judicial system in recent decades has moved away from religion and 'irreligion has now become
a religion').
176. Professor Wilber G. Katz observed that the elimination of religion from the school
curriculum amounts to the establishment of secular humanism. W. Katz, Religion and American
Constitutions, Julius Rosenthal Foundation Lecture, Northwestern University School of Law
(Mar. 21, 1963). See also THt WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AN STATE 5 (D. Oakes, ed. 1963);
Note, supra note 140, at 1217-18 (Lemon test can establish secular humanism).
The nineteen eighties saw numerous battles between Christianity and secular humanism. In
the ninteen nineties the religion could very well battle new foes such as "New Age" philosophies.
The issue is not specific doctrines but the ability of modern philosophies to claim the preferred
status of "irreligious".
177. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488
(1961); Smith v. Board of School Comm'r, 655 F. Supp. 939 (S.D. Ala.), rev'd, 827 F.2d 684
(11th Cir. 1987); Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D. Ala.), rev'd
sub nom. Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526 (1 1th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
178. Smith, 655 F. Supp. at 966, is an excellent example of how the current Lemon test will
always seem inappropriate to the prejudiced religious faction. Under the "primary effect"
prong, the court is left to decide whether the primary effect is to either advantage or inhibit
religion. Judge Hand thought that the text books in question in Smith did have such an effect.
The litigants obviously shared this view. The three judges sitting for the eleventh circuit,
however, not only thought otherwise, but saw such a view as "clearly erroneous." Id. at 690
n.41.
179. See L. TRIBE, supra note 52, at 819 (discussion of voluntarism under the establishment
clause).
180. For example, in 1960, state and local governments contributed only negligible amounts
to private colleges and universities. By 1970, the amount had reached $100 million. In the same
period, federal aid jumped from $500 million to $2.1 billion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602, 630 n.13 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring).
181. Leonard Levy claims that nonpreferentialists "prefer government sponsorship and sub-
sidy of religion rather than allow it to compete on its merits against irreligion and indifference."
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church and government is an impossibility which must be acknowledged
before profitable discussion can take place.'82 Any attempt to erect a wall
separating church and state necessarily favors the values of anyone whose
world view can be described as "irreligious.1' '83
4. Popular Sovereignty and the Popular Minority
A final and more intricate problem involves the unnecessary violation of
popular sovereignty. A local government's freedom to legislate is a bulwark
for the maintenance of government "by" and "for" the people. Polls suggest
that a large segment of the United States population desires that organized
voluntary prayer be put back in the public schools.1 4 Its prohibition does
not reflect popular sovereignty; it advances the interests of an irreligious
minority.'85
At first glance, it would seem that this accords with the manner in which
many constitutional prohibitions operate. However, such is not the case.
8 6
L. LEVY, supra note 13, at 118. Many claim that this contention is inverted. Perhaps religion
is being forced to compete against an "established" atheism. See F. COLUMBo, supra note 128,
at 153 (discussing new right view that "irreligion has now become a religion"); F. SCRAEFFER,
A CHmIsAN MANIFESTO (1981).
It could be argued that protection of "religious" beliefs and practices should be favored
over general libertarian rights because religion, when offended, can have transcending ramifi-
cations not present in other situations.
182. On a superficial level, this fact is obvious. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614
(1971) (some government-religious organization relationship inevitable); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 422 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (same); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312
(1952) (same). In a more fundamental way, government must eventually advocate some religious
viewpoints. See Laycock, supra note 124, at 1374 (suggesting total separation is an impossibility).
Cf. Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'r, 554 F. Supp. 1104, 1130-31 n.41 (S.D. Ala.), rev'd
sub nom. Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526 (l1th Cir. 1983) ("slippery slope" argument about
impossibility of purging all religious views from public school system), aff'd, 466 U.S. 182
(1984).
183. Compare Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103 (1968) (invalidating Scopes-type anti-
evolution statute as violation of religion clauses) with Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578
(1987) (invalidating Louisiana law requiring "creation science" to be taught in conjunction with
evolution). It could be said that the religious who previously attempted to discriminate against
the irreligious (in Scopes) are now getting a dose of their own medicine. However, instead of
working like a pendulum, the present situation, which constitutionally invalidates only religious
teaching, is better described by the analogy of a ratchet. In both Scopes and Aguillard, the
views of an arguably religious majority were at stake. Only the irreligious view in Scopes,
however, eventually prevailed.
184. See J. REICHLEY, supra note 5, at 149 (claiming national opinion polls consistently show
7506 of public favors return to organized, voluntary prayer in schools); U.S. News and World
Rep., Apr. 6, 1987, at 64 ("In a recent Atlanta Journal and Constitution poll of 2,000 likely
Republican voters in a dozen southern states, 3 of every 4 favored a constitutional amendment
authorizing public-school prayer.").
185. It is recognized that the minority enfranchised in the school prayer example could also
be one motivated by religious concerns. The key issue is not disenfranchisement of the religious,
but disenfranchisement of a majority.
186. Individual rights are safeguarded through two means: popular sovereignty for the
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Constitutional guarantees often frustrate popular desires, but that frustration
usually implicates a constitutionally inferior interest.' In establishment clause
cases, the interest of the advantaged minority is often no more legitimate
than that of the majority. Separationist policies subvert popular sovereignty,
yet do not appreciably increase the protection of religious interests. Current
establishment clause interpretations simply inject an institutional bias against
one candidate for majority control. While separationist policies may ensure
that no majority religious group becomes too powerful, 8' all religious groups,
whether representative of majority or minority interests, are disadvantaged
vis-a-vis the irreligious.'8 9
This unnecessary bias is peculiar only to the area of religion. While
protection of other fundamental rights engenders difficult tensions, these
tensions do not force a choice between competing groups with constitutionally
equivalent claims. For example, in the area of seditious speech, public safety
interests may be required to yield to the dominance of the first amendment
freedom of speech right.190 Similarly, in the criminal process, a fundamental
constitutional guarantee for the accused may "trump" society's interest in
procedural efficiency or public safety. 9'
Establishment problems, however, represent a different breed of tension
in that religious liberty concerns exist on both sides of the balancing equation.
The Aguillard'92 case is illustrative of a situation in which a majority's
sovereign interests could be subverted by the establishment clause, but, unlike
the above examples, the interest in separation deserves no trumping authority
over an explicitly protected right to free exercise. In that case a majority of
the Louisiana legislature decided that their public schools should, in the
name of "academic freedom," teach creation science in conjunction with
majority and specific constitutional protection for the minority. At one time the religion clauses
protected both. However, current constructions of the establishment clause discriminate against
the majority religious viewpoint regardless of the possible nonexistence of majority subversion
of minority rights.
187. For example, compare an individual's right to free speech and the citizen's right to an
environment free from vulgar or offensive language. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15
(1971) (overturning prosecution for vulgar "speech").
188. The value of the free exercise clause must not be forgotten with respect to this issue.
The question is not whether or not this interest is protected, but whether the additional protection
of the establishment clause is needed. See infra note 229.
189. There is no separate provision mitigating this problem as there is for that of inordinate
influence of a religious sect. It is interesting to note that the "Bill for Establishing Religious
Freedom," proposed by Madison, penned by Jefferson, passed by the Virginia assembly in
1786, and oft cited by separationists as an example of revolutionary sentimentalities, actually
disestablished the Anglican Church which, at the time, represented only a slim minority of the
population. Hart, The Wall that Protestantism Built, 46 HERITAGE FOUND. POL'Y REV. 44, 50
(Fall 1988).
190. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (invalidating law punishing advocacy
of racial violence).
191. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
192. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
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evolution. 93 The law was invalidated based on a summary judgment that
the law's intent was really to further Christianity. This holding, however,
begs the question of what free exercise rights a majority has when it thinks
the "secular" curriculum is teaching falsehoods. Indeed, it is presumably
this free exercise right which is being protected by the separationist doctrine.
In such a case, a majority religious interest is supplanted by the identical,
not superior, interest of a minority.
Self-government is the principal means for securing liberty,' yet, in a
noble attempt to become the guardians of religious rights, the Supreme Court
has dismantled this most fundamental protection.
C. Federalism's Solution
Both the simplistic strict separationist position and the more subtle Lemon
test present serious threats to religious liberty. The ramifications of a policy
which attempts to shield government from the influence of religion lead to
violations of free exercise, discrimination against religious persons, and
frustration of the popular will. These negative consequences more than offset
any benefits acquired by a separationist policy. The banning of religion from
public life is not the intent of the establishment clause, however, and the
deficiency of separation, therefore, does not operate to vilify the first
amendment.
1. The Case for Rollback
By formulating an efficient procedural framework, the establishment clause
simply places church/state authority in the hands of the more appropriate
decisionmaking forum-i.e., the states.195 It is this animating federalist intent
which serves to mitigate the very problems that current establishment clause
interpretations aggravate.
If all church/state separation doctrines were discarded, popular sovereignty
concerns would be satisfied, the majority's free exercise interests would be
accommodated, and bias favoring irreligious perspectives would be discarded.
The free exercise clause would protect against violations of minority religious
rights. Assuming the inevitability of some subtle state espousal of a religious
view, most would agree that this design is preferable to one allowing "non-
193. It is assumed arguendo that the Louisiana state legislative intent represents a majority
interest. It is realized that a state legislature's ability to reflect majority concerns is an issue in
and of itself. See G. CALARaazsI, A COMMON LAW FOR Tim AOE OF STATUTES 59-68 (1982). Few
would argue that the fourteenth amendment incorporated provisions of the Bill of Rights to
protect majority interests.
194. Ti FEDERALIST No. 41, at 255 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
195. The choice being made here is between state and national government. There is no
intent to claim preference for state over more local bodies. Indeed, an application of the
principles proffered by this Article would force many church/state decisions into the hands of
local government. This was not uncommon even in colonial times. See supra note 38.
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religious" minority views to prevail over the popular will.196 This scheme
does not satisfy expanded American concepts of liberty, however, as majority
accommodation is not enough. The depreciation of anyone's beliefs should
be avoided if at all possible. A worthwhile goal, therefore, is to strive for
accommodation of as many religious perspectives as possible without of-
fending the rights of the majority. Herein lies the benefit of federalism.
A majority "will" is rarely discernible nationally, and even if it were, its
imposition would hardly be efficient in accommodating the greatest number
of people. The very difficulty the Court has had in creating a cohesive and
popular nonestablishment policy evidences this fact. 197 The solution, there-
fore, is not found in any specific church/state policy, but in the same concept
of federalism advocated by the Constitution's framers. Under this arrange-
ment, each community retained its freedom to develop procedures and
principles which would accommodate the greatest portion of its own popu-
lation. Since most religious concerns had their outlet in local politics, there
was no need for national legislative competence. *9s This federalist concept,
applied today, could provide for legislation which maximizes accommoda-
tion,' 99 yet minimizes discrimination.2°0
The result would be a greater deference to popular sovereignty, and a
more efficient allocation of legislative competence. This efficiency could be
196. Britain and several Scandinavian countries have for years protected free exercise while
supporting religious establishment. West Germany and Switzerland endorse religion generally
by providing for "multiple establishments." J. RmcmniEY, supra note 5, at 135. By contrast,
the constitution of the Soviet Union employs a clause depicting a church/state wall of separation.
See KONST. SSSR art 124. But can it be said that the Soviet citizenry enjoys more religious
liberty than Britons or nineteenth century New Englanders? For a description of various foreign
treatments of church/state relations, see L. PFEFFER, supra note 38, at 28-62; W. RAWLE, supra
note 87, at 121.
Pfeffer concludes that religious liberty is most secure where church and state are most
completely separated. L. PFEFFER, supra note 38, at 62. This conclusion is ill-informed. While
it may be true that some form of separation commonly exists in states where religious freedom
is present, there are few foreign examples of church/state separation which rival U.S. treatment.
The Soviet Union stands out as one such example and it could only be described as an exception
to Pfeffer's rule. The advisability of some separation does not support a call for "complete"
separation.
197. See Committee for Public. Education v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1981) ("Establishment
Clause cases are not easy; they stir deep feelings; and we are divided among ourselves, perhaps
reflecting the different views on this subject of the people of this country.").
198. See text accompanying notes 23-44.
199. See McConnell, Book Review, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1484, 1496 (1987) (example of
federalism's ability to more efficiently accommodate popular views). See generally Amar, Of
Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987) (emphasizing role of state courts and
legislatures in promoting constitutional values).
200. Acknowledging the inevitability of some subtle discrimination, the key to federalism's
value lies in its ability to prevent all "unnecessary" discrimination. In the eighteenth century,
like today, there were few religious interests which required government involvement at a
national level. Schools, for example, were controlled locally. Therefore, there was no legitimate
need for a religious majority to legislate matters nationally which could affect the state school
systems.
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derived through two means: (1) the manufacture of case-specific solutions
for the diverse church/state problems which differ among various demo-
graphic situations; 201 and (2) the ability to conduct local "experiments"
which would not upset the entire national polity.22 The wide variance of
religious opinion in the United States, and its disproportionate distribution,
make it certain that application of federalism principles in this area would
enable a greater number of people to enact laws which accord with their
own religious convictions. Discrimination problems are properly resolved
through free exercise protection, establishment problems through democratic
government. 23
2. The Case For Separation
The concerns of many separationist scholars are legitimate and are not
fully resolved by the federalist scheme. Justice Brennan probably best artic-
ulates these problems in his concurring Abington opinion. Brennan argues
the infeasibility of a "common core" of theology tolerable to all creeds. 204
He also accurately points out that a policy which "establishes," but does
201. National policy decisions cannot be tailored to meet the needs of all groups. As legislative
authority is pushed down toward the people, governments can adjust specific policies to reduce
infringement of minority rights (e.g. a town that is 40% Jewish might adjust its school calendar
to accommodate religious holidays). Michael McConnell cites three advantages of decentralized
decisionmaking: (1) ability to reflect diversity of interests; (2) preventing mutually disadvanta-
geous attempts of communities taking advantage of each other; and (3) innovation and com-
petition among governments. McConnell, supra note 194, at 1493-1500.
It should be noted that people could also "vote with their feet." While this might seem
unrealistic regarding states, people regularly decide where to reside based on the quality of the
public school system. Free exercise protections would ensure that there would be no need to
relocate because of church/state interaction, but it is not unreasonable to predict that local
demographics would adjust to reflect subtle differences. See Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local
Expenditures, 64 J. POL. EcoN. 416 (1956) (mobility and decentralized regime can combine to
thoroughly satisfy preferences).
202. The excessive number of 5-4 Supreme Court decisions evidences an inability to agree
on an appropriate church/state policy. See, e.g., the five separate opinions in Allegheny v.
ACLU, 109 S.Ct. 3086 (1989). This impasse could be circumvented, and effective policies
developed, if states were allowed to serve as proving grounds for the various solutions to the
church/state dilemma. Justice Brandeis once said: "It is one of the happy incidents of the
federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory,
and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country ......
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See also
Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 582 (1981) (states may permit electronic media at trial
because notions of federalism require states to be able to experiment); Hart, The Relations
Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. RaV. 489, 493 (1954) ("State statutory law
reflects predominantly this capacity of a legislature to introduce novel techniques of social
control. The federal system has the immense advantage of providing forty-eight separate centers
for such experimentation.").
203. "If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican
principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote." THE FEDERALIST
No. 10, at 80 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
204. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 286 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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not mandate adherence, is hardly neutral. Excusing school children from
Bible reading, while satisfying free exercise demands, does little to fulfill
neutrality requirements and does not eliminate subtle influences. °0 Brennan
joins many in his fundamental argument that freedom from establishment
is a right in itself.2°0
Justice Brennan admits to the legally problematic nature of establishment
clause incorporation, but opines that state disestablishment made any intent
to protect state churches an historical anachronism.20 7 He also argues that
today's increased plurality and heightened government involvement in per-
sonal affairs demand an expanded application of nonestablishment princi-
ples. 208 Federalism does not purport to offer a clean solution to all church/
state problems, but the remainder of this Article demonstrates why the
federalist scheme is significantly superior to the one we now have.
3. Exaggerated Fears
Who's to say religion and politics shouldn't mix?
Whose Bible are they reading anyway?
-Archbishop Desmond Tutu2°9
While Justice Brennan effectively demonstrates that today's circumstances
do not closely resemble those of yesterday, he fails to adequately explain
why the new situations push in the direction of church/state separation. In
fact, the inverse is true. As government becomes more involved in the daily
lives of individual citizens, the inevitability of church/state interaction in-
creases and the mistaken temerity of separationist doctrines becomes more
evident. 2 10 Government is an arm for administering the will of all people,
not just those whose interests are nonreligious. Modern relations between
citizen and state provide a stronger, not weaker, case for reliance on fed-
eralism principles.
Equally unpersuasive are Brennan's arguments regarding the heterogeneous
nature of modern society.2 1' The fact that actual church establishment is so
205. Id. at 288.
206. See, e.g., L. LEVY, supra note 13, at 168. "Freedom from an establishment, even a
nonpreferential one, is an indispensable attribute of liberty." Id.
207. Abington, 374 U.S. at 255.
208. Id. at 240. See also L. LEvy, supra note 13, at 175 (arguing that the establishment
clause should be broader in meaning because we are more religiously pluralistic).
209. See C. COLSON, supra note 171, at 277.
210. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (pointing
to the increasing inevitability of church/state interaction.) See also J. REiCm.Ev, supra note 5,
at 136 (discussing impracticability of excluding religion from various human affairs); L. TRIBE,
supra note 52, at 812 (same).
211. By focusing on the heterogeneous nature of modern society, Justice Brennan inadver-
tently points to the applicability of Madison's argument that when there is a greater variety of
parties and interests there is a smaller likelihood of invasion of individual rights. THrE FEDERALIST
No. 10, at 83 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). See also TIte FEDERALIST No. 51 (Madison
expressing concern over prospect of majority faction invading rights of others).
1228 [Vol. 39:1191
1990] CHURCH, STATE AND FEDERALISM 1229
antithetical to our twentieth century sensibilities does not confirm the need
for a separationist policy; it allays fears that reestablishment will actually
take place.2 12 America's religious evolution portends the inverse of a drastic
increase in church/state entanglement; 213 each state constitution now contains
a provision protecting free exercise, 2 4 and no state has indicated a desire to
establish a religious sect. 215 Throughout the past century the emerging plu-
rality has directed states toward disestablishment.
The argument is not that church/state separation as we know it will remain
secure. 216 If strict separationist policies were abandoned to accommodate
federalism principles, there would undoubtedly be instances of legislation
supporting certain religious views or favoring religion generally.2 7 Regret-
tably, as in all political decisions, discrimination might arise. The inferior
position of the minority in a world without incorporation, however, need
be no more severe than it is under existing doctrines. 218
212. A majority coalition today would need to profess some acknowledgment of a restraint
on church/state interaction in order to be politically viable. It is less likely that an establishment-
oriented faction will gain discriminatory control in 1990 than it was in 1790 because such a
faction would have far more difficulty in capturing a majority voice. See J. REICHLEY, supra
note 5, at 157 (discussing political realities of 20th century with respect to religious factions).
213. See Comment, supra note 101, at 944 (concluding that the principle ground for rejecting
the Blaine Amendment was that state constitutions afforded adequate protection). Cf. Paty v.
McDaniel, 547 S.W.2d 897, 900-01 (Tenn. 1977) (instance where state went farther than the
first amendment in separating church and state by prohibiting ministers and priests from serving
in the legislature).
214. Thirty-four state constitutions contain provisions prohibiting the actual establishment
of a state church. Sachs, Fundamental Liberties and Rights Against the 50 States, in INDEX,
LEo1sLATrvE DRAFTING AND RESEARCH FUND OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 79 (1982).
215. The argument for rollback is not meant to rely on a claim that church/state separation
as we know it would remain intact. Utah, to some, might stand out as a possible exception to
the general rule that church/state interaction would remain minimal. Interestingly, establishment
in Utah was also a concern for Congress when it reconsidered a form of the Blaine Amendment
in 1888. 20 CONG. RC. 421 (1888); O'Brien, supra note 98, at 197. This is a problem, however,
which is best worked out within Utah's polity. In fact, Utah's constitution states: "The State
shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion or prohibiting the free-exercise
thereof." UTAH CONST. art. I, § 4. The free exercise clause remains to prevent egregious
violations of religious liberty. See infra note 229.
216. Conversely to the nonestablishment provision in many state constitutions, the consti-
tutions of all 50 states contain an appeal or a prayer to the "Almighty God." See CoRtRESPON-
DENT, Dec. 1984, at 5, col. 2.; W. KATZ, supra note 61, at 3-5. This suggests that the framers
of these constitutions did not see disestablishment as requiring the severing of all state religious
involvements. It is thus likely that state judiciaries would differ with the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the establishment clause.
217. But cf. I. BRANT, supra note 51, at 345 (arguing that one who "can establish Christianity
can establish any sect").
218. Discrimination, of course, is not the only concern. See T. CURRY, supra note 14, at 8,
175, 217; L. LEV, supra note 13, at 168, 183-84 (describing concern of historical theologians
like Isaac Backus and Roger Williams regarding corruptive influence of government involvement
in church affairs). What is being called for here is not a coalescing of church and state as a
policy matter. Indeed, this author earnestly espouses some forms of separation. See C. COLSON,
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The free exercise clause would still remain as the strongest safeguard of
religious liberty for the minority.2 19 The idea that general government disa-
bility is necessary to supplement that safeguard, is both specious and atypical.
Drawing again from the related area of free speech while neither federal nor
state government can arbitrarily limit one's right to free expression, the
government itself is not correlatively constrained with an inability to speak. 2 0
4. Federalism Remembered
By 1833 all states had abandoned established churches. 21 Justice Brennan
asserts that this development renders any states-rights issue moot. Such an
assertion, however, begs the question of why that opens doors for a restric-
tion of state authority. Likewise, the argument fails to recognize continuing
applicability of federalist doctrines in church/state policy-making. The con-
tention might have some validity if actual church establishment were the
only concern,222 but the argument is particularly inappropriate considering
the Court's expansive reading of the establishment clause. Disestablishment
did not mean that the states abandoned all religious influence in government.
Quite to the contrary, many simply adopted a nonpreferentialist approach
which to a greater or lesser degree promoted Judeo-Christian principles. 2 3
supra note 171, at 48 ("Victory for either [religious or political institutions] would mean defeat
for both."). The goal of this Article is the adoption of a better method for separating the two
realms so that they might coexist in a way which forces religion to succeed on its own merits,
yet removes unnecessary obstacles to its furtherance and the sovereignty of the American people.
219. There is one adjustment which may be called for by the nation's evolution; that is the
extension of free exercise rights to the irreligious. While rollback of incorporation appropriately
causes the nonreligious to lose their favored status, religious liberty also insists on equal
protection for all views. If free exercise rights were not thus extended, rollback could cause a
loss of liberty for the atheist.
220. Government espousal of a specific ideology does little to encourage neutrality, yet few
would call for the prohibition of a public school teacher's democratic rhetoric in the presence
of children with Communist philosophies. The Communist is guaranteed the right to speak
what he or she believes, not to be free from an opposing government sponsored view (or even
to be free from paying taxes to support it).
221. Among the last were: South Carolina in 1790, Maryland in 1810, Connecticut in 1818,
New Hampshire in 1819, and Massachusetts in 1833. J. REICHLEY, supra note 5, at I l; Paulsen,
supra note 16, at 317 n.37.
222. Of course, there would then today be no claims of establishment clause violation.
223. See J. REICHLEY, supra note 5, at 115 for a discussion of nonpreferentialist approaches.
Maryland, for example, required a declaration of belief in God as a prerequisite for the holding
of public office until 1961. State courts, even from states without established religions, often
held Christianity to be part of the common law. Even advocates of the Blaine Amendment
seem to have approved of nonpreferentialist approaches. The second proposal of the "school-
church" amendment in 1876 included a clause in the Senate version which assured that the
amendment would never be interpreted to exclude Bible reading in public schools. 4 CONG.
REc. 5245 (1876). Subsequent proposals even mandated the teaching of religion. O'Brien, supra
note 98, at 194-98. See also 7 CoNG. REc. 252 (1878) (similar provision in subsequent proposal).
It seems that even the legislators that presumably favored incorporation never desired an
establishment clause which would apply more comprehensively against states than against the
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One need not abandon disestablishment as a policy224 in order to allow more
state flexibility in legislating on religious matters. 22'
The one supplemental safeguard which can positively complement the right
to free exercise is the establishment clause's scheme for distributing deci-
sionmaking authority. Popular will should not be subverted to avoid subtle
religious influence when the inverse situation is just as discriminatory to an
even greater number of people. However, if that popular will can be satis-
factorily expressed at a more local level of government, it should be en-
couraged. Besides providing an outlet for popular sovereignty, this scheme
insures the smallest possible intrusion on minority religious interests. 226 As
the level of active decisionmaking moves closer to the people, the enacting
of varied policy decisions can greatly increase the number of people satisfied
with the result.
Policy concerns regarding religious liberty in a society without incorpo-
ration are indeed valid, but reliance on separationist doctrines to resolve
those concerns is misplaced. The propitious balance of power contemplated
by the establishment clause can provide a more equitable solution. 227 Fed-
eralism in this area dictates that judicial scrutiny in church/state matters
focus on the appropriateness of a particular forum for deciding a policy
question and not the policy itself.221
federal government. But cf. L. LEVY, supra note 13, at 93 (arguing that the first amendment
should not be viewed as empowering Congress in any way-i.e. it did not authorize nonpre-
ferential support). In response to Levy, it should be remembered that states already possessed
the power to support religion long before the first amendment was passed. Therefore, even
allowing for incorporation of the establishment clause, there is nothing to preclude a nonpre-
ferentialist position with respect to states.
224. "[T]he Constitution [does not] require complete separation of church and state; it
affirmatively mandates accommodation." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984).
225. Without "establishing" a religion, a state might simply adjust the overbroad way in
which the Supreme Court has applied the establishment clause. One survey demonstrates the
potential for different rulings on nonestablishment issues by merely changing the forum to that
of the state courtroom. "[O]f the 23 state appellate courts which have considered the issue of
Bible-reading in public schools, 17 held that the practices challenged did not violate state or
federal constitutional provisions." M. ABERNATHY, supra note 145, at 263.
226. See supra note 196.
227. Cf. G. CALABREsi, supra note 189, at 8-15. The "Flight to the Constitution" and its
Bill of Rights can be a quick fix which leads to harmful long-term results. The federal system
can, on occasion, impede the efficient administration of government. The opposite is true in
this area, however, where the federal courts have shown themselves to be incompetent in
developing a coherent body of law. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 107 (1985) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting). In Wallace, Justice Rehnquist stated in dissent that:
[I]n the 38 years since Everson our Establishment Clause cases have been neither
principled nor unified. Our recent opinions, many of them hopelessly divided
pluralities, have with embarrassing candor conceded that the 'wall of separation' is
merely a 'blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier,' which 'is not wholly accurate'
and can only be 'dimly perceived.'
Id.
228. Chancellor Kent once stated: "The most solid basis of public safety consists, not so
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D. Federalism at Work
What is needed today is the reformulation of a dual standard where stricter
separationist principles are applied to the federal government and states are
permitted greater freedom. This kind of federalist structure is certainly not
foreign to the Court and has been successfully applied in other contexts.
Justice Harlan argued in favor of a "dual standard" for state and federal
governments in free speech cases. 229 Justice Scalia voiced federalism concerns
in his dissent to Aguillard,30 and Justice Rehnquist has often referred to the
unhappy demise of state autonomy.23 ' The case for an analogous dual
standard in the area of religious liberty proceeds afortiori from the treatment
Justices Harlan and Burger have given to the law surrounding freedom of
expression for two reasons. First, establishment questions implicate counter-
balancing free exercise rights which are themselves constitutionally protected.
In the area of speech, the dual standard is warranted merely to give greater
deference to a state's analysis of competing interests and to acknowledge
areas of unique state competence (e.g. police powers).23 2 These interests are
not themselves constitutional guarantees. With respect to the establishment
clause, however, the competing concern is itself a constitutionally protected
community interest, i.e., religious liberty.
More importantly, arguments for a dual standard proceed afortiori in the
area of religion because the Constitution more explicitly mandates a federalist
scheme with respect to religious liberty. The constitutionally blessed policy
much in bills of rights, as in the skilful organization of the government and its aptitude, by its
structure and by the spirit of the people to produce wise laws." J. KENT, supra note 47, at
205.
229. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 496 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). By concurring in an opinion applying federal law, Harlan acknowledged a
violation of the right to free speech. By dissenting to the state law portion of the decision,
however, he acknowledged a state's interest in having obscenity standards and gave greater
deference to state competence in balancing local interests. Justice Burger's treatment of obscenity
and free speech in his Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), decision similarly recognizes
the wisdom of allowing local majority-created community obscenity standards to prevail in
cases involving competition with free-speech rights. When two legitimate fundamental policy
concerns are in issue, treatment of the concerns is best done where the effects are felt. See also
W. VAN ALSTYNE, INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1984) (arguing expanded need
for police powers at state level).
230. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 610 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
231. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 720 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Justice Rehnquist states, "The state may justify an inroad on religious liberty by showing that
it is the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state interest." Id. at 718.
232. "People in different States vary in their tastes and attitudes, and this diversity is not
to be strangled by the absolutism of imposed uniformity." Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,
33 (1973). Justice Harlan's dual standard obviously does not require an actual rollback of the
incorporation theory, but the policy effects are analogous. "The inappropriateness of a single
standard for restricting State and Nation is indicated by the disparity between their function
and duties in relation to those freedoms." Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 505 (quoting
from Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 294-95).
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with respect to speech finds its authority in the structure of government and
in the broad provisions of the tenth amendment. Deference regarding church/
state policy, however, distinguishes itself in a specific clause mandating a
federalist structure. The establishment clause not only complements the
federalism principals of the tenth amendment; it presumably negates any
confusion regarding their applicability in the area of religion. "[Ilt is not
without irony that a constitutional provision evidently designed to leave the
States free to go their own way should now have become a restriction upon
their autonomy.' '233
A similar federalist scheme could be beneficially applied in matters of
religious establishment. Establishment issues which implicate minimum free
exercise and equal protection concerns should be subject only to state
scrutiny. Undoubtedly, many of the cases which now appear before the
Court would be reframed to express legitimate free exercise interests. 23 4 In
deciding these cases, the Court would properly limit its rulings to issues
which directly impact free exercise rights but do not diminish the state's
authority to resolve the complex situational problems regarding church/state
relations.
The school prayer issue presents a good example of how the policy could
work. If a school district enacted a policy of providing a recited prayer
during the school day, an offended parent's complaint could be expected to
implicate both free exercise and establishment concerns. Assuming the policy
met the state's constitutional mandates, the Supreme Court would properly
hear the free exercise claim. But in tailoring a remedy, it would defer to
state desires respecting church/state ties. The Court might rule that the state
must accommodate a Buddhist student's religious convictions by exempting
him or her from attendance. It would be improper, however, for the Court
to reject the state's entire policy which presumably satisfies the free exercise
concerns of a majority of the class. 2"
233. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 310 (1963) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
234. One commentator has suggested how similar legal results could be obtained by processing
establishment clause claims under the free exercise clause via a class-action mechanism. Note,
Reconceptualizing Establishment Clause Cases As Free Exercise Class Actions, 98 YALE L.J.
1739, 1739-40 (1989) (arguing that many presently proscribed church/state interactions would
remain constitutionally infirm under free exercise analysis instead of establishment clause
doctrines). See also Mozert v. Hawkins County Pub. Schools, 647 F. Supp. 1194 (E.D. Tenn.
1986) (free exercise case which could have been fashioned under the establishment clause as in
Smith v. Board of School Comm'rs, 655 F. Supp. 939 (S.D. Ala.), rev'd, 827 F.2d 684 (11th
Cir. 1987)).
235. Another example can be found in Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987). Leo
Pfeffer has argued that while the Court's ruling regarding improper establishment is correct,
the free exercise concerns of certain students might mandate that special provisions be made
for instruction in creationism. L. Pfeffer, Address at Yale Divinity School (Apr. 1988). This
kind of policy, though sensitive to religious liberty concerns, could prove to be extremely
inefficient. If the majority of students claimed a religious right to be taught creationism alongside
evolution, the result would be an expensive and unusual situation in which a majority of the
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III. CONCLUSION
The wording of applicable constitutional provisions, the historical inten-
tions of its framers, and current policy concerns all militate against the
current Supreme Court establishment clause doctrine. The only justification
then remaining is precedent, and, by itself, precedent is no justification.236
When all legitimate bases for a constitutional doctrine are exhausted, intel-
lectual respectability, constitutional integrity, and deference to popular sov-
ereignty mandate that it be overturned.
This nation's forefathers devised a scheme to resolve the free exercise-
nonestablishment tension-a scheme which worked for 150 years and can
work today. The Supreme Court, in deciding to apply the establishment
clause to the states, has incorrectly interpreted the Constitution. It has thus
upset the balance contemplated by our federal system, inverted the rights
and prohibitions designed for nation and state with respect to religion, and
caused unnecessary inconsistency and strain on church/state relations.
Church and state law represents the quintessential opportunity for appli-
cation of federalist principles. While federalism does not eliminate religious
liberty concerns, it provides a solution which mitigates deleterious effects on
freedom. It is a solution which represents the wisdom of both the past and
the present. The Supreme Court should adjust its doctrine with respect to
the establishment clause and defer to state governments when nonestablish-
ment issues are raised and free exercise concerns are minimal. This reliance
on federalism would facilitate a more coherent and equitable constitutional
law.
class would be sent elsewhere for special instruction. Under a scheme which defers to local
majoritarian interest, the default course of instruction would involve both evolution and
creationism. If the resultant violation of religious freedom seemed egregious enough, the
Supreme Court might then rule that the state must provide special instruction for the minority
of students who's religious freedom was offended.
236. Precedent can itself be contradictory and often shifts. In areas involving the federal
Constitution, the doctrine of stare decisis is particularly inappropriate as the sole support for
judicial misinterpretation since correction through legislative action is practically impossible.
Cf. Wells, The Unimportance of Precedent in the Law of Federal Courts, 39 DEPAut L. REv.
357 (1990) (arguing that stare decisis is less important in federal courts cases than elsewhere).
Hence, the Court has been more willing to examine and overrule constitutional precedent than
it has statutory precedent. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-07 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). "[This Court's] opinion upon the construction of the Constitution is
always open to discussion when it is supposed to have been founded in error, and its judicial
authority should hereafter depend altogether on the force of the reasoning by which it is
supported." Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 470 (1849), quoted in Graves v. O'Keefe,
306 U.S. 466, 492 n.ll (1939).
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